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Completing activities online are a part of everyday life, both professionally and 
personally. But, conducting daily operations, interacting, and sharing information on the 
Internet does not come without its risks as well as a potential for harm. Substantial 
financial and information losses for individuals, organizations, and governments are 
reported regularly due to vulnerabilities as well as breaches caused by insiders. Although 
advances in Information Technology (IT) have been significant over the past several 
decades when it comes to protection of corporate information systems (IS), human errors 
and social engineering appear to prevail in circumventing such IT protections. While 
most employees may have the best of intentions, without cybersecurity skills they 
represent the weakest link in an organization’s IS security. Skills are defined as the 
combination of knowledge, experience, and ability to do something well. Cybersecurity 
skills correspond to the skills surrounding the hardware and software required to execute 
IS security to mitigate cyber-attacks.  
 
The main goal of this research study was to develop a scenarios-based, hands-on measure 
of non-IT professionals’ cybersecurity skills. As opposed to IT professionals, end-users 
are one of the weakest links in the cybersecurity chain, due to their limited cybersecurity 
skills. Historically, non-IT professionals (i.e., office assistants, managers, executives) 
have access to sensitive data and represent 72% to 95% of cybersecurity threats to 
organizations. This study addressed the problem of threats to organizational IS due to 
vulnerabilities and breaches caused by employees. Current measures of cybersecurity 
skills of non-IT professionals are based on self-reported surveys and were found 
inaccurate. Prior IS and medical research found participants view scenarios as 
nonintrusive and unintimidating. Therefore, this research study utilized scenarios with 
observable hands-on tasks to measure and quantify cybersecurity skills of non-IT 
professionals.  
 
This study included developmental research with a sequential-exploratory approach to 
combine qualitative and quantitative data collection. To ensure validity and reliability of 
the Cybersecurity Skills Index (CSI), a panel of 18 subject matter experts (SMEs) 
reviewed the CSI following the Delphi expert methodology. The SMEs’ responses were 
incorporated into the development of an iPad application (app) prototype 
(MyCyberSkills™). Following the iPad app prototype development, eight SMEs 
  Melissa Carlton 
provided feedback on the scenarios, tasks, and scoring of the app using the Delphi 
technique. Furthermore, pilot testing of the app was conducted by manually collecting 
and scoring the hands-on task performance of a group of 21 non-IT professionals. The 
manually collected data were compared to the app computed results to ensure reliability 
and validity. All revisions were incorporated into the prototype prior to the start of the 
empirical research phase. 
 
Once the iPad app prototype was completed and fully tested, the quantitative research 
phase used the prototype to collect data and document the results of the measure. 
Participants from multiple public organizations were asked to complete the scenarios-
based, hands-on tasks as presented in the prototype. Following the pre-analysis data 
screening, this study used a combination of descriptive statistics and one-way analysis of 
variance (ANOVA) to address the research questions. Results from 188 participants 
indicate that educational level and experience using technology appear to be significant 
demographic variables when it comes to the level of cybersecurity skills demonstrated by 
non-IT professionals. Moreover, job function, hours accessing the Internet, or primary 
online activity did not appear to be significant variables when it comes to the level of 
cybersecurity skills of this population.  
 
This research validated that the CSI benchmarking index could be used to assess an 
individual’s cybersecurity skills level. As organizations continue to rely on the Internet 
for conducting their daily operations, understanding an employee’s cybersecurity skills 
level is critical to securing an organization’s IS. Moreover, the CSI operationalized into 
the MyCyberSkills™ iPad app prototype can be used to assess an organization’s 
employee’s demonstrated skills on cybersecurity tasks. Furthermore, assessing the 
cybersecurity skills levels of employees could provide an organization insight into what 
is needed to further mitigate threats due to vulnerabilities and breaches caused by 
employees. Discussions and implications for future research are provided.  
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
Background 
 The threats to organizational information systems (IS) due to vulnerabilities and 
breaches caused by employees continue to cause not only financial losses, but also 
information losses (Hovav & Gray, 2014; Jensen, Bailey, & Baar, 2014; Peha, 2013). The 
protection of IS lie in the most vulnerable spot; that vulnerability usually rests in 
individuals (Mitnick & Simon, 2002). Organizations and individuals rely on the 
embedded security features of the information technology (IT) products and services 
(Peha, 2013). Even with sophisticated intrusion detection systems, organizations are still 
at risk because employees make mistakes due to the convincing nature of social 
engineering incidents (i.e., phishing attacks, drive-by downloads, etc.). An employee, 
even with the best intentions, may work in an insecure manner or under stress and cause a 
threat (PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC), 2013). This study addressed the need for 
additional empirical investigation and measures of cybersecurity skills, especially of non-
IT professionals (Choi, 2013; Choi, Levy, & Hovav, 2013; Thomson & von Solms, 2005; 
Torkzadeh & Lee, 2003). The results of this study contribute to the IS body of knowledge 
by providing researchers and practitioners insight into the cybersecurity skills level of 
non-IT professionals. Participants asked to respond to a survey were found unwilling to 
report their actual behaviors related to cybersecurity issues in the workplace (Hu, Xu, 
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Dinev, & Ling, 2011). However, D’Arcy, Hovav, and Galletta (2009) found scenarios 
were a nonintrusive and unintimidating method to participants when attempting to collect 
computer misuse data. Moreover, participants preferred hands-on tasks when in an IS 
learning environment (Li & Liu, 2011). Thus, this study utilized scenarios with 
observable hands-on tasks to measure cybersecurity skills. Additionally, the results of 
this study promise to influence industry practices in mitigating the vulnerabilities and 
threats associated with cyber-attacks.  
 The remainder of this draft is organized in the following manner. First, a 
statement of the specific problem researched is presented. Next, the main dissertation 
goal and research questions as well as the relevance and significance of the research are 
discussed. A brief review of literature of related areas of research is presented within 
each of the relevant areas: malware, personally identifiable information (PII), and work 
information systems (WIS). Specific barriers and limitations are discussed. Finally, the 
approach section outlines the specific data analyses used to formulate a users’ CSI, as 
well as a definition of terms. 
 
Problem Statement  
 The problem that this research addressed is the threats to organizational IS due to 
vulnerabilities and breaches caused by employees (Hovav & Gray, 2014; Jensen et al., 
2014; Peha, 2013). According to Axelrod (2006), cybersecurity is “the prevention of 
damage to, unauthorized use of, exploitation of, and if needed, the restoration of 
electronic information and communications systems to ensure confidentiality, integrity, 
and availability” (p. 1). Skill is defined as “a combination of ability, knowledge, and 
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experience that enables a person to do something well” (Boyatzis & Kolb, 1991, p. 280). 
Therefore, cybersecurity skills (i.e., preventing malware, PII theft, WIS breaches) 
correspond to an individual’s technical knowledge, ability, and experience surrounding 
the hardware and software required to execute IS security to mitigate cyber-attacks (Choi 
et al., 2015). Improvements of IT tools (i.e., blacklists, whitelists, security pop-up 
messages, etc.) do not appear to solve the cybersecurity problem of a user without 
cybersecurity skills becoming prey to the deceptive nature of social engineering 
techniques (Algarni, Xu, Chan, & Tian, 2014). The protection of information lies in the 
most vulnerable spot and that vulnerability usually rests in individuals (Mitnick & Simon, 
2002). It appears that a non-IT professional with limited cybersecurity skills presents 
opportunities for organizational information vulnerabilities and threats. 
 The importance of cybersecurity skills of non-IT professionals has not minimized 
over the years. Phish Tank (2009) and the Anti-Phishing Working Group (APWG) (2010) 
identified threats to frequently targeted markets (auction, financial, payment services, & 
retail). Five years later, Internet Service Providers (ISPs), classifieds, gaming, 
government, and social media were added to the list of targeted markets (APWG, 2014). 
Many approaches from artificial intelligence to security education, training, and 
awareness (SETA) programs attempt to mitigate the challenge of cyber threats. Phishing 
detection methods (i.e., blacklists, whitelists, heuristics, domain name server (DNS) 
analyzers, Classifier System, Lookup System, & hybrids) are usually invisible to the user; 
the detection occurs prior to the phished communication actually reaching the user 
(Hajgude & Ragha, 2012). User interfaces have seen updates to include security pop-up 
messages (Hong, 2012), inhibitive attractors (Bravo-Lillo et al., 2013), and domain-
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highlighting (Lin, Greenberg, Trotter, Ma, & Aycock, 2011). Organizations and 
individuals rely on the embedded security features of the IT products and services sold on 
the Internet (Peha, 2013). Even with embedded IT security tools working well, the non-IT 
user may still receive a social engineering message that can hook them into making 
mistakes due to low cybersecurity skills (Winkler & Dealy, 1995).  
In December 2013, Target Corporation announced its point-of-sale (POS) system 
experienced a data breach that began with a malware attack on a contractor (Yadron, 
Ziobro, & Devlin, 2014; Ziobro, 2014). Similarly, compromised login credentials of 
some employees were used by hackers to gain access to eBay’s entire user database 
(Bensinger & Calia, 2014). The U.S. Department of Homeland Security (2012) 
recognized the great escalation of the nation’s cyber threat in recent years. 
Recommendations were made to develop and advance technical cybersecurity skills as a 
way to encourage qualified candidates (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2012). 
Those users armed with the skills needed to quickly identify and report possible cyber-
espionage occurrences “discovered more breaches than any other internal process or 
technology” (Verizon Enterprise Solutions, 2014, p. 42). “Yet we ignore the human 
factor in corporate security at our peril, since it’s all too clear that technology alone can’t 
guarantee security” (Kaspersky Lab, 2013, p. 15). Thus, it appears that additional 
empirical investigation on cybersecurity skills of non-IT professionals is warranted 
(Choi, 2013; Thomson & von Solms, 2005; Torkzadeh & Lee, 2003).  
 
Dissertation Goal 
 The main goal of this research study was to design, develop, and empirically test a 
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set of hands-on tasks set to measure the cybersecurity skills level of non-IT professionals. 
The need for this work was demonstrated by the work of Choi (2013), Furnell (2007), 
Whitman (2004), Havelka and Merhout (2009), as well as Rubin and Dierdorff (2009). 
Furnell (2007) found that individuals were not attuned to observe the visual, technical, 
and language cues involved with phishing e-mails. Whitman (2004) noted that human 
error or failures were the highest threat to information security. Furthermore, a user’s 
habituated disregard of a security warning for a Website increases risk to IS security 
(Vance, Anderson, Kirwan, & Eargle, 2014). Havelka and Merhout (2009), as well as 
Rubin and Dierdorff (2009) focused on the need to include competencies, skills, 
knowledge, and abilities in the classroom so students had the tools (experience) necessary 
for future employment. The maturing of an individual’s knowledge and skills develops 
user competency (Eschenbrenner & Nah, 2014). Choi (2013) recognized the lack of 
research involving cybersecurity skills, and the need for a better measure to assess 
cybersecurity skills. Furthermore, Choi (2013) identified self-reported surveys as a 
limitation of research due to a participant’s reluctance to report actual misuse behavior or 
their inability to properly judge their accurate cybersecurity skill levels. Whereas, 
Torkzadeh and Lee (2003) cautioned self-reported perceived skills do not always 
correspond to the individual’s actual skills. In the work of Gravill, Compeau, and 
Marcolin (2006), the use of paper versus computer self-reported evaluative measures 
varied more in accuracy than self-reported factual information, i.e., years of experience. 
Xu and Yeh (2012) adjusted for the varying individualities of the assessors that may 
create biases in the self-assessment process. Thus, this study was aligned to develop a set 
of scenarios that were used to assess the hands-on cybersecurity skills of non-IT 
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professionals based on demonstrated skills on cybersecurity tasks.  
 This work built on prior research by first identifying the difference between skills 
and competence. Burley, Eisenberg, and Goodman (2014) stated that cybersecurity was 
not a solitary occupational category and identified that knowledge, skills, and abilities 
were needed for more than cybersecurity work. According to Toth and Klein (2014), 
knowledge gathered by users and honed skills in a certain functional area developed 
competencies. Both Burley et al. (2014), as well as Toth and Klein (2014) appeared to 
exclude the very important factor of ‘experience’ or assumed it under another defined 
category. Toth and Klein (2014) excluded an additional factor, ‘ability’ altogether. 
According to Boyatzis and Kolb (1991), as well as Levy (2005), skill is a combination of 
knowledge, experience, and abilities that enables users to perform well. Over time, skills 
are honed and competencies are acquired (Eschenbrenner & Nah, 2014). A user’s 
computer competence is vital for an organization that relies on its employees to possess 
skills (i.e., combination of knowledge, experiences, & abilities) to complete technical 
tasks (Downey & Smith, 2011). More than any other internal process or technology, 
breaches were discovered by users armed with the skills needed to quickly identify and 
report possible cyber-espionage occurrences (Verizon Enterprise Solutions, 2014). Of the 
16,000 responding to a phishing quiz, McAfee Labs (2014) found 80% had fallen for one 
out of seven phishing e-mails. Those in accounting, finance, and human resources, 
“which arguably hold some of the most sensitive corporate data, performed the worst” 
(McAfee Labs, 2014, p. 4). According to PwC (2013), most security incidents were 
attributed to everyday insiders like current or former employees. Verizon 
Communication’s chief security officer stated “it’s important to note that insider threats 
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are not necessarily a ‘bad guy’ with bad intentions; it could be a good employee doing 
righteous work in an insecure manner” (PwC, 2013, p. 8). Moreover, due to the lack of 
technological backgrounds and skills, non-IT professionals (including managers) reported 
finding themselves ‘left behind’ the IT staff (Guzman, Stam, & Stanton, 2008). 
Furthermore, even with the best intentions, mistakes of non-IT users (i.e., office 
assistants, managers, executives), due to poor cybersecurity skills, represent the weakest 
link in an organization’s IS security. Thus, this leads to the importance of a measure to 
assess the level of cybersecurity skills held by a non-IT professional.  
 This work secondly built on prior research by developing a measure that assessed 
the cybersecurity skills of non-IT professionals. Bronsburg (2011), as well as Morcke, 
Dornan, and Eika (2013) mentioned the importance of demonstrating the high-level of 
skills experienced in the medical and health profession academic programs. Hands-on 
skill assessment is a substantial part of the medical academic community (Berendonk, 
Stalmeijer, & Schuwirth, 2013). The importance of skills and hands-on skills assessment 
found in the health industry appears applicable to cybersecurity skills as well. Torkzadeh 
and Lee (2003) used self-reported surveys to research the individual’s perception of his 
or her IT skills and cautioned that perceived skills do not always correspond to actual 
observable skills. In the work of Gravill et al. (2006), users inaccurately assessed their 
knowledge of a specific software package. Prior literature such as Moskal (2010), Weigel 
and Hazen (2014), as well as Xu and Yeh (2012), addressed the flaws and consequences 
of erroneous self-assessment reporting. Thus, this research study established and 
validated a set of hands-on tasks that measured observable cybersecurity skills of non-IT 
professionals without the bias of or need for self-assessment.  
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 The validity of observable hands-on tasks builds on the prior research of Katz 
(1974), Williamson (1975), Swanson (2004), as well as Vassiliou et al. (2014). Hands-on 
skills were developed by employee experimentation (trial & error) over time (Katz, 1974; 
Williamson, 1975). Swanson (2004) argued hands-on tasks were crucial for an 
employee’s learning outcomes. Observable hands-on skills testing provided the unbiased 
evidence of competence required to perform a surgical endoscopy without the high-stakes 
risk to a patient (Vassiliou et al., 2014). Thus, this study established a measure that 
provides unbiased observable cybersecurity skills assessment without the high-stakes risk 
to IT by using expert-validated set of cybersecurity skills and scenario driven tasks.  
The five specific goals of this research study were as follows. The first specific 
goal of this study identified a set of cybersecurity skills pinpointed by subject matter 
experts (SMEs) as those that can help mitigate critical vulnerabilities, which usually 
involve the compromise of devices, computers, and/or networks by non-IT professionals 
within their organizations. The second specific goal of this study developed a set of tasks 
that were categorized and linked to the SMEs identified set of cybersecurity skills. The 
third specific goal of this study developed a benchmarking index to hierarchically 
aggregate the set of SMEs identified cybersecurity skills using observable hands-on tasks. 
Such aggregated measure is called the Cybersecurity Skills Index (CSI) and integrated 
the set of measurable cybersecurity skills into a single benchmarking index ranging from 
zero to 100. According to Fenrich (2005), “hands-on skills can transfer to the real world” 
(p. 353). Chisholm et al. (2013) utilized a hands-on skills test to assess a group of 
emergency physicians’ ability to work with medical technology equipment. Therefore, 
the fourth specific goal of this study empirically tested the CSI, which is based on real-
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life scenarios, for cybersecurity skills on a group of 188 non-IT professionals. Prior IS 
research, e.g., Algarni, Xu, and Chan (2015), as well as Sheng, Holbrook, Kumaraguru, 
Cranor, and Downs (2010), found a correlation between demographic factors and victims 
of cybersecurity threats. Therefore, the last specific goal of this study empirically 
assessed the contribution of age, education level, gender, job function (e.g., 
administrative staff, managerial, executive, operations, physical security, information 
technology, technical services, & other), primary online activity, number of hours 
accessing the Internet, and experience using technology to the CSI. 
 
Research Questions 
The main research question that this study addressed is: What tasks enable the 
validation of a hierarchical measure for observable cybersecurity skills of non-IT 
professionals? In addition, this study addressed five specific research questions as 
follows.  
RQ1: What are the specific subject matter experts (SMEs) identified set of 
cybersecurity skills of non-IT professionals, which address the most 
common organizational cybersecurity threats? 
RQ2: What are the specific SMEs identified tasks that can be categorized, linked, 
and validated to the set of the identified cybersecurity skills? 
RQ3: What are the specific SMEs identified weights of the tasks and skills that 
enable a validated hierarchical aggregation to the Cybersecurity Skills 
Index (CSI) benchmarking index? 
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RQ4: What are the scores of the CSI benchmarking index for the aggregated set 
of SMEs identified cybersecurity skills of a group of 188 non-IT 
professionals?  
RQ5: Are there any significant differences to CSI based on age, gender, 
educational level, job function, primary online activity, number of hours 
accessing the Internet, or experience using technology? 
 
Relevance and Significance  
Relevance 
The purpose of this study was to seek mitigation of the threats to organizational IS 
due to vulnerabilities and breaches caused by non-IT professionals. Adversaries focus on 
gaining access to IS through employees (Kaspersky Lab, 2013). In a benchmark study, 
Ponemon Institute (2014a) found that human error or malicious attacks (i.e., criminal 
insiders, malware infections, or phishing/social engineering) were the root cause for 72% 
of organizational data breaches. There has been a variety of research studies focused on 
cybersecurity issues relating to embedded security features (Bravo-Lillo et al., 2013; 
Hong, 2012; Lin et al., 2011). However, a review of literature reveals that few studies 
have focused on cybersecurity as it relates to non-IT professionals (Choi et al., 2013; 
Jensen et al., 2014; Peha, 2013). Cybersecurity threats and vulnerabilities are causing 
substantial financial losses for individuals, organizations, and governments all over the 
world (Levy, Ramim, Furnell, & Clarke, 2011; Ramim & Levy, 2006). Cyberwar is 
another major concern that nations around the world are struggling to get ready to fight or 
maintain strong defense tactics. According to PwC (2013), an employee with the best 
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intentions working in an insecure manner may cause a threat. As organizations continue 
to rely on the Internet for conducting their daily operations, understanding an employee’s 
cybersecurity skills levels is critical to securing information and the systems that stores it. 
Given the documented increase in importance of cybersecurity in everyday activity, the 
relevance of this study is substantial. 
Significance 
This research advanced current research in cybersecurity and facilitated an 
increase in the body of knowledge regarding non-IT professionals as it relates to their 
cybersecurity skills in the context of malware, PII, and WIS. Prior research noted paper 
(Gravill et al., 2006) and self-reported (Torkzadeh & Lee, 2003) surveys did not 
accurately assess actual skills. According to Downey and Smith (2011), a user’s 
computer competence is vital for an organization that relies on its employees to possess 
skills, (i.e., knowledge, experiences, & abilities) to complete technical tasks. The 
investigation of a good problem statement has practical significance (Terrell, 2012). 
Insight into an employee’s cybersecurity skills levels can potentially help reduce the 
opportunities for organizational information vulnerabilities and threats. As seen in 
literature, organizations have an ongoing need for non-IT cybersecurity skilled 
professionals. Therefore, this study focused mainly on the non-IT professionals 
representing corporate organizations. Moreover, given the documented increase in 
individual, organizational, and governmental cybersecurity incidents, the significance of 
this study is substantial. 
 
Barriers and Issues 
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 One potential barrier for this study was obtaining permission to measure the 
cybersecurity skills of non-IT professionals. Institutional Review Board (IRB) approval 
was needed in order to use non-IT professionals as participants. Approval to conduct the 
study was obtained prior to pursuing IRB approval. 
 Using the Delphi technique was a potential barrier. According to Gordon (1994), 
participant selection, following the Delphi technique, requires a great deal of attention 
and the researcher must meticulously prepare and test questionnaires to avoid ambiguity. 
Collecting an adequate number of responses from SMEs throughout the Delphi technique 
proved challenging as well (Gordon, 1994). In addition, identifying and locating the 
SMEs added to the challenge of the Delphi technique. Scheele (1975) recommended 
providing gifts or ‘in kind’ rewards as a way to encourage participation.  
Appropriately implementing the development research within the accepted 
parameters is a potential barrier. The elements of development research focuses 
on complex, innovative solutions that have few, if any, accepted design and 
development principles; a comprehensive grounding in the literature and theory; 
empirical testing of product’s practicality and effectiveness, as well as thorough 
documentation, analysis, and reflection on processes and outcomes (Ellis & Levy, 
2009, p. 328).  
With a foundation in literature (i.e., Ellis & Levy, 2010; Hevner & Chatterjee, 2010), this 
study progressed towards a successful research level design and development effort that 
incorporated the Delphi technique expert panel.  
 While developing and validating such a comprehensive set of scenarios-based, 
hands-on benchmarking index is valuable for organizations, the process of implementing 
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it in order to actually measure such skills was challenging. In order to overcome this 
issue, this study developed an iPad application (app) prototype that operationalized the 
previously developed and validated scenarios-based, hands-on tasks CSI into an actual 
app that was used to collect the cybersecurity skills data. 
 
Limitations and Delimitations 
Limitations 
A limitation of this study was related to the expert opinions collected during the 
Delphi technique. Expert opinions are limited to those members recruited (Ellis & Levy, 
2010). Therefore, combining the Delphi technique, review of literature, and a pilot-test 
mitigated this limitation. Furthermore, the recruitment of experts was not limited to one 
industry or government type. Thus, mitigating the limitation of bias. 
Additionally, measuring the participant’s responses to the scenarios-based, hands-
on cybersecurity tasks was a limitation. Validity and reliability would be threatened if the 
MyCyberSkills™ iPad app incorrectly recorded or scored the participants’ responses. In 
order to mitigate this limitation, an iterative development process was followed (Sheng, 
Magnien, Kumaraguru, Acquisti, & Cranor, 2007). Furthermore, an ongoing review of 
the data recorded and respective scoring was tested throughout the development process. 
A comprehensive review was conducted during the pilot-test to ensure the participants’ 
responses were correctly recorded and scored prior to conducting the empirical study. 
Moreover, internal validity would be threatened if participants chose not to respond 
truthfully to the cybersecurity tasks presented during the data collection process (Ellis & 
Levy, 2010). Therefore, the vulnerability for respondents to desire to provide consistent 
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or socially-acceptable answers was mitigated by presenting four scenario-based, hands-on 
tasks to measure each respective cybersecurity skills (Verplanken & Orbell, 2003). 
Furthermore, a participant completed each of the observable hands-on, scenario-based 
cybersecurity tasks while in the presence of an IS security expert. Each participant that 
completed all of the cybersecurity tasks were offered an honorarium (Scheele, 1975). 
Delimitations 
 A delimitation of this study was its limitation to a single mobile technology 
platform, an iPad app. Furthermore, this study was limited to the Southeastern United 
States. Participants’ responsiveness to the iPad app was seen as a possible delimitation of 
the study as it may not be the same presented on a different platform and/or at other 
institutions.  
 
Definitions of Terms 
 The following represent terms and definitions. 
Cybersecurity Skills Index (CSI) – The cybersecurity skills index is a logical and 
repeatable quantitative measure that indicate the level of cybersecurity skills of an 
individual.  
Cyber-attack – illegal activities or a crime that takes place on an information system, 
i.e., theft of software, data, unauthorized access, or modification of information (Libicki, 
Senty, & Pollak, 2014; Ramim & Levy, 2006). 
Cybersecurity – “the prevention of damage to, unauthorized use of, exploitation of, and 
if needed, the restoration of electronic information and communications systems to 
ensure confidentiality, integrity, and availability” (Axelrod, 2006, p. 1).  
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Cybersecurity risk – describes any disruption of daily operation and monetary loss 
caused by a malicious cyber event (Mukhopadhyay, Chatterjee, Saha, Mahanti, & 
Sadhukhan, 2013; National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), 2014). 
Cybersecurity skill – correspond to an individual’s technical knowledge, ability, and 
experience surrounding the hardware and software required to execute IS security to 
mitigate cyber-attacks (Choi et al., 2013). 
Information System (IS) – “A discrete set of information resources [i.e., personnel, 
equipment, funds, and information technology] organized for the collection, processing, 
maintenance, use, sharing, dissemination, or disposition of information. Also includes 
specialized systems such as industrial/process controls systems, telephone switching and 
private branch exchange (PBX) systems, and environmental control systems” (Kissel, 
2013, p. 101).  
Information Technology (IT) – “Any equipment or interconnected system or subsystem 
of equipment that is used in the automatic acquisition, storage, manipulation, 
management, movement, control, display, switching, interchange, transmission, or 
reception of data or information” (Kissel, 2013, p. 104). 
Instrument – “Any means used to measure or otherwise study subjects. In the language 
of social and behavioral research, an instrument can call to mind a mechanical device (as 
it does in ordinary language – a dentist’s drill, a saxophone), but it is used more broadly 
to include written instruments, such as attitude scales or interview schedules” (Vogt & 
Johnson, 2011, p. 181). “Therefore, indices, scales, and questionnaires are all 
measurement instruments” (Mendoza, 2014, p. 4). 
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Personally identifiable information (PII) – Any information about an individual that 
may be used to distinguish or trace an individual’s identity, i.e., name, social security 
number, date and place of birth, mother’s maiden name, or biometric records, either alone 
or when combined with other public information that is linkable to a specific individual, 
i.e., medical, educational, financial, and employment information (Krishnamurthy & 
Wills, 2009; McCallister, Grance, & Scarfone, 2010). 
Phishing – A cyber-attack that mimics a legitimate or trusted Website to lure victims to 
disclose their user ids, passwords, or other personal information; it is being used in 
conjunction with social engineering attacks (McDowell, 2006; Ramim & Levy, 2006). 
Risk – “a measure of the extent to which an entity is threatened by a potential 
circumstance or event, and typically a function of: (i) the adverse impacts that would rise 
if the circumstance or event occurs; and (ii) the likelihood of occurrence” (NIST, 2006, p. 
8). 
Risk mitigation – “prioritizing, evaluating, and implementing the appropriate risk-
reducing controls/countermeasures recommended from the risk management process” 
(Committee on National Security Systems (CNSS), 2010, p. 62). 
Skill – “a combination of ability, knowledge, and experience that enables a person to do 
something well” (Boyatzis & Kolb, 1991, p. 280). 
Social engineering – the process of deceiving or influencing individuals to provide 
personal or corporate information in order to compromise the victim’s information 
system (computer) for the purpose of benefiting the attacker (Algarni et al., 2014; 
Mitnick & Simon, 2002; Winkler & Dealy, 1995) 
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Vulnerability – “A weakness in a system that can be exploited to violate the system’s 
intended behavior relative to safety, security, reliability, availability, and integrity or to 
obtain access to some asset” (Andrews & Whittaker, 2004, p. 70). 
Work Information System (WIS) – An information system operating in an 
organization. 
 
Summary  
 This study addressed the threats to organizational IS due to vulnerabilities and 
breaches caused by employees by designing, developing, and empirically testing a 
hierarchical measure for observable cybersecurity skills of non-IT professionals (Hovav 
& Gray, 2014; Jensen et al., 2014, Peha, 2013). Non-IT professionals (i.e., office 
assistants, managers, executives) historically have access to sensitive data and represent 
72% to 95% of cybersecurity threats to organizations. However, current measures of 
cybersecurity skills are based on perceived skills and self-reported surveys that do not 
always correspond to actual observable skills (Torkzadeh & Lee, 2003; Xu & Yeh, 2012). 
As seen in the medical and healthcare academic curriculum, assessing observable high-
level hands-on skills allow for experience without harm to a system or individual 
(Chisholm et al., 2013; Fenrich, 2005). Thus, the importance of skills and hands-on 
assessment appears applicable to cybersecurity skills of non-IT professionals. Therefore, 
by using expert-validated set of cybersecurity skills and scenario driven tasks, this study 
established and validated a set of hands-on tasks that measures observable cybersecurity 
skills of non-IT professionals without bias or the high-stakes risk to IT.   
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Chapter 2 
Review of the Literature 
 
Introduction  
 In this chapter, a literature review is presented to provide a synopsis of the 
relevant literature pertaining to skills, data breaches, and cybersecurity as well as to lay 
the theoretical foundation for this study. The literature review was an important first step 
and “the theoretical foundation for the empirical study” (Paré, Trudel, Jaana, & Kitsiou, 
2015, p. 183). Furthermore, a systematic search of quality peer-reviewed and secondary 
IS literature substantiates the existence of the research problem, vindicates a new 
contribution to the existing body of knowledge, and structures the study (Levy & Ellis, 
2006; Paré et al., 2015). To ensure breadth, depth, rigor, consistency, clarity, brevity, as 
well as an effective analysis and synthesis, an extensive search of the IS literature domain 
was conducted using interdisciplinary fields including aviation, IS, medical, and 
transportation (Hart, 1998). From this literature review, existing knowledge, research 
questions, approach, and theoretical foundation for this study of designing, developing, 
and empirically testing a scenarios-based, hands-on hierarchical cybersecurity skills 
index were discovered. Moreover, information regarding cybersecurity skills shortage, 
risk mitigation, and tools are presented. Furthermore, in order to operationalize the CSI 
into an actual app, the scenarios and hands-on tasks were designed and developed 
utilizing literature from this review.  
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Skills and Competencies 
Skills Defined 
According to Boyatzis and Kolb (1991) as well as Levy (2005), skill is a 
combination of knowledge, experience, and abilities that enables users to perform well. 
The acquisition of a skill is a learning process and generally adopts three incremental 
stages (Anderson, 1982; Gravill et al., 2006). These stages begin with the initial 
acquisition of a skill known as declarative knowledge (Stage 1). At this stage, instruction 
and information about a skill are given to the user (Anderson, 1982; Fitts, 1964). 
Moreover, Stage 1 allows the user to establish the knowledge needed as a foundation for 
later learning stages (Gravill et al., 2006). The second stage of skill acquisition (Stage 2) 
allows the learner to practice declarative knowledge and convert it to procedural 
knowledge (Fitts, 1964; Neves & Anderson, 1981). Knowledge becomes better organized 
and users start to connect the actions needed to complete an activity (Gravill et al., 2006). 
Next, at the third stage, comes automaticity (Fitts, 1964; Marcolin, Compeau, Munro, & 
Huff, 2000). Users progress beyond the initial acquisition stage into an efficient and 
autonomous (Stage 3) by increasing their experience level (Anderson, 1982; Gravill et 
al., 2006; Kraiger, Ford, & Salas, 1993). Experience positively influences a user’s 
computer usage, which helps establish the needed experience of the skill (Gravill et al., 
2006). The ability to generalize procedures and increase performance occurs during the 
acquisition of knowledge phases (Marcolin et al., 2000). Over time, Eschenbrenner and 
Nah (2014) identified that skills are honed and competencies are acquired. The skill 
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development stages are shown in Figure 1. Whereas, Table 1 lists a summary of research 
studies defining skills and the skill development stages. 
 
Figure 1. Skill development stages over time 
 
Table 1 
 
Summary of Skills Defined 
Study Methodology Sample Instrument 
or Construct 
Main Finding or 
Contribution 
Anderson, 
1982 
Theoretical  Acquisition of 
cognitive skill 
Skill acquisition is 
a learning process 
that has three 
stages (e.g., 
declarative, 
procedural, & 
automaticity); each 
require time for 
honing  
     
Boyatzis & 
Kolb, 1991 
Development 
and empirical 
study via 
video/audio 
taped 
sessions 
236 adults 
consisting of 
students, 
managers, and 
an assortment 
of 
manufacturing 
professionals 
Personal and 
organizational 
skills based 
on the theory 
of learning 
Developed and 
validated the 
learning skills 
profile, which 
assesses learning 
skills through a 
typology of 12 
skill scales 
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Table 1 
 
Summary of Skills Defined (Cont.) 
Study Methodology Sample Instrument 
or Construct 
Main Finding or 
Contribution 
Eschenbrenner 
& Nah, 2014 
Literature 
review and 
synthesis 
 IS user 
competency, 
social 
cognitive 
theory 
Developed a 
conceptual 
foundation of IS 
user competency 
and proposed an IS 
user competency 
framework 
     
Fitts, 1964 Theoretical  Perceptual-
motor skill 
learning 
Skill learning is a 
continuously 
evolving 
hierarchical process 
that with practice 
over time leads to 
peak performance 
(i.e., competency) 
     
Gravill et 
al., 2006 
Empirical 
study via 
paper survey 
and controlled 
experiment 
67 volunteers 
from four large 
financial, 
retail, 
consulting, and 
distribution  
organizations  
Self-assessed 
user 
competence 
End-users did 
accurately self-
assess their software 
knowledge, but did 
improve as 
experience and 
understanding of IT 
increased 
     
Kraiger et 
al., 1993 
Theoretical  Cognitive, 
skills-based, 
and affective 
outcomes 
theories 
Identified 
framework for 
evaluating learning 
outcomes using an 
organized 
classification 
scheme 
     
Levy, 2005 Empirical 
study via 
longitudinal 
study 
2 MBA 
programs (one 
online and one 
on-campus) 
Learning 
skills profile 
Skills were 
positively enhanced 
in both the online 
and on-campus 
MBA programs 
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Table 1 
 
Summary of Skills Defined (Cont.) 
Study Methodology Sample Instrument 
or Construct 
Main Finding or 
Contribution 
Marcolin et 
al., 2000 
Empirical 
study via 
survey and 
flash-card 
self-efficacy 
assessment 
66 university 
administrators 
and students 
End-user 
competency 
End-users ranked 
higher their 
perceived ability to 
use a software 
package than their 
demonstrated 
competence level of 
the same software 
package  
 
Competence vs. Skills 
Bronsburg (2011) as well as Morcke et al. (2013), demonstrated the importance of 
the high-level of skills experienced in the medical and health profession academic 
programs. The need to include competencies, skills, knowledge, and abilities in the 
classroom so students have the tools (experience) necessary for future employment were 
the focus of the research by Havelka and Merhout (2009), as well as Rubin and Dierdorff 
(2009). Havelka and Merhout (2009) found that knowledge is obtained through 
coursework. Whereas, Rubin and Dierdorff (2009) found the courses offered by colleges 
and universities are relevant to the competency level of a student. It was discovered that 
the maturing of an individual’s knowledge improves skills, which then develops user 
competency (Eschenbrenner & Nah, 2014). Moreover, it was previously noted in 
literature that knowledge gathered by users and honed skills in a certain functional area 
developed competencies (Toth & Klein, 2014). A misalignment between course offerings 
and required corporate competencies reduces the individual’s exposure to important 
knowledge that is needed to do a task well (Rubin & Dierdorff, 2009). Additionally, it 
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was noted that a reasonable degree of competency at a skill “requires at least 100 hours of 
learning and practice” (Anderson, 1982, p. 369). An individual’s competency level of a 
particular skill is valuable; it may influence or even determine an individual’s level of 
professional success and satisfaction (Havelka & Merhout, 2009; Levy & Ramim, 2015). 
Moreover, IT feature use was found to positively influence an increase in an end-user’s 
skills (Benilian, 2015). A user’s computer competence is vital for an organization that 
relies on its employees to possess skills, (i.e., knowledge, experiences, & abilities) to 
complete technical tasks (Downey & Smith, 2011). Thus, it appears competency is 
acquired after a skill is practiced over time (Levy & Ramim, 2015). A summary of 
research studies regarding skill, competence, and the development of competence are 
listed in Table 2. 
Table 2 
 
Summary of Competence vs. Skills 
Study Methodology Sample Instrument 
or Construct 
Main Finding or 
Contribution 
Bronsburg, 
2011 
Empirical 
study via 
survey 
102 medical 
students at a 
private non-
profit 
university in 
the 
Southeastern 
U.S. 
Learning 
skills profile 
to measure IT 
skill 
competency 
To better prepare a 
medical student for 
the workforce, 
opportunities to 
learn IT skills are 
needed 
     
Downey & 
Smith, 2011 
Empirical 
study via 
survey 
610 
midshipmen 
in the U.S. 
Navy’s 
commission-
ing program 
Competence 
and it 
relationship 
with attitudes 
Competence and 
attitudes were 
improved with 
skills training 
     
24 
 
Table 2 
 
Summary of Competence vs. Skills (Cont.) 
Study Methodology Sample Instrument 
or Construct 
Main Finding or 
Contribution 
Eschenbrenner 
& Nah, 2014 
Literature 
review and 
synthesis 
 IS user 
competency, 
social 
cognitive 
theory 
Developed a 
conceptual 
foundation of IS 
user competency 
and proposed an IS 
user competency 
framework 
     
Havelka & 
Merhout, 2009 
Theoretical  IT 
professional 
competence 
Developed a 
theoretical model of 
skills (i.e., 
knowledge, 
experiences, and 
abilities) desired for 
IT specialists 
     
Levy & 
Ramim, 2015 
Empirical 
study via 
quasi-
experiment 
253 business 
management 
students 
Skills and 
competence 
assessment 
Students with 
hands-on 
experience (i.e., 
computer 
simulation) 
performed better 
than those without 
     
Morcke et al., 
2013 
Literature 
review and 
analysis 
 Outcome 
(competency) 
based 
education 
Undergraduate 
medical education 
programs for nearly 
60 years have 
utilized outcome 
(competency) based 
education 
     
Rubin & 
Dierdorff, 
2009 
Empirical 
assessment 
373 U.S. 
colleges and 
universities 
MBA 
curricula and 
managerial 
competencies  
Competencies in 
the classroom were 
found necessary to 
prepare students for 
future employment 
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Table 2 
 
Summary of Competence vs. Skills (Cont.) 
Study Methodology Sample Instrument 
or Construct 
Main Finding or 
Contribution 
Toth & Klein, 
2014 
Standard  Role-based 
model for 
Federal 
IT/cyber-
security 
training 
Specific 
IT/cybersecurity 
training for an 
individual based on 
job function and 
responsibilities 
 
Information Technology Skills 
One of the main challenges in the study of IT skills is the fact that IT skills have 
been measured, predominantly in research, based on self-reported survey instruments 
(Levy, 2005; Torkzadeh & Lee, 2003). Adomßent and Hoffman (2013), as well as 
Beaudoin, Kurtz, and Eden (2009), identified that competencies are important to 
accomplish something successfully and responsibly. Lerouge, Newton, and Blanton 
(2005) defined IT skills as those skills that correspond to the technical knowledge 
regarding the hardware, software, and programming features of IS. Marakas, Yi, and 
Johnson (1998) concluded the increase of technology skills across users is important as 
IT becomes a mainstay in the daily lives of individuals. New technologies are adopted by 
organizations regularly (Weigel & Hazen, 2014). According to Marcolin et al. (2000), 
competence with IT not only empowers users, it has an effect on their workplace 
productivity. In order to effectively use IT for the benefit of the organization, a user 
needs to acquire skills working with new IS and technologies (Eargle, Taylor, Sawyer, & 
Gaskin, 2014). IT skills are essential for an organization to gain competitive equality, but 
the management of those IT skills sustain an organization’s competitive advantage (Mata, 
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Fuerst, & Barney, 1995). Thus, the importance of assessing those skills warrants 
additional research (Levy & Ramim, 2015; Weigel & Hazen, 2014). Table 3 lists a 
summary of research studies regarding the importance of IT skills.  
Table 3 
 
Summary of Information Technology Skills 
Study Methodology Sample Instrument 
or Construct 
Main Finding or 
Contribution 
Adomßent 
& 
Hoffman, 
2013 
Concept 
paper 
 Competencies 
in the context 
of education 
for sustainable 
development 
Competency is 
important to 
accomplish an 
educational 
sustainable 
development.  
     
Beaudoin 
et al., 2009 
Empirical 
study via 
survey 
318 online 
learners from 
Western, 
Japanese, 
Mexican, and 
Israeli 
countries 
System of 
knowledge, 
experience, 
and abilities 
Derived a set of 
competencies useful 
for successful online 
learning 
     
Eargle et 
al., 2014 
Empirical 
study via 
self-reporting 
survey 
377 users of 
Microsoft 
Excel 
Skill 
acquisition 
and 
habituation 
A person’s skill 
acquisition through 
multi-purposing is 
improved by 
comprehensiveness of 
use and atypical use 
     
Lerouge et 
al., 2005 
Empirical 
study via 
mailed 
surveys 
124 IS 
professionals 
IS skill set A systems analyst 
position requires a 
multi-faceted skill set, 
but the skills were not 
ranked equally in 
terms of job 
importance and 
preferred use 
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Table 3 
 
Summary of Information Technology Skills (Cont.) 
Study Methodology Sample Instrument 
or Construct 
Main Finding or 
Contribution 
Levy, 2005 Empirical 
study via 
longitudinal 
study 
2 MBA 
programs 
(one online 
and one on-
campus) 
Learning 
skills profile 
Skills were positively 
enhanced in both the 
online and on-campus 
MBA programs 
     
Levy & 
Ramim, 
2015 
Empirical 
study via 
quasi-
experiment 
253 business 
management 
students 
Skills and 
competence 
assessment 
Students with hands-
on experience (i.e., 
computer simulation) 
performed better than 
those that did not 
     
Marakas et 
al., 1998 
Literature 
review and 
synthesis 
40 papers 
focused on 
the CSE 
construct as a 
developed 
measure or 
evaluated as a 
variable 
Computer 
self-efficacy 
Negative impacts 
associated with 
personnel introduced 
to IT may be tempered 
with increase 
computer self-efficacy 
through experience 
and knowledge 
     
Marcolin et 
al., 2000 
Empirical 
study via 
survey and 
flash-card 
self-efficacy 
assessment 
66 university 
administrators 
and students 
End-user 
competency 
End-users ranked 
higher in their 
perceived ability to 
use a software 
package than their 
demonstrated 
competence level of 
the same software  
     
Mata et al., 
1995 
Literature 
review and 
analysis 
5 IT-based 
sources of 
competitive 
advantage 
Strategic 
management 
theory  
Managerial IT skills 
were a source of 
sustained competitive 
edge. 
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Table 3 
 
Summary of Information Technology Skills (Cont.) 
Study Methodology Sample Instrument 
or Construct 
Main Finding or 
Contribution 
Torkzadeh 
& Lee, 
2003 
Empirical 
study via 
developed 
instrument 
 
282 end-users 
from variety 
of industries 
and 
management 
levels 
Perceived 
end-user 
computing 
skills 
Identified 12 items for 
measuring perceived 
end user computing 
skills, but cautioned 
perceptions do not 
always correspond to  
actual skills 
     
Weigel & 
Hazen, 
2014 
Empirical 
study 
22 IS 
graduate 
students 
employed in 
an IT position 
Technology 
proficiency 
assessment 
Addressed the flaws 
and consequences of 
erroneous self-
assessment reporting 
by presenting 
technology 
proficiency 
assessment constructs 
 
 
Data Breaches 
 From 2005 to 2012, Privacy Rights Clearinghouse (2014) reported over 607 
million records lost from nearly 3,500 data breaches. According to Boritz and No (2011), 
in the past government agencies were only involved in egregious privacy breaches. One 
and one-half years later, President Barack Obama signed Executive Order No. 13,681 
(2014) requiring “the use of multiple factors of authentication and an effective identity 
proofing process” (p. 63492) when a U.S. citizen’s personal data is made available 
through digital applications. Nearly 1.6 billion records were reported lost from 453 data 
breaches during the period of January 2013 to December 2014 and an additional 454 
breaches occurred with an unknown number of lost records (Privacy Rights 
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Clearinghouse, 2014). According to Identity Theft Resource Center (ITRC) (2015), 25% 
of the 64 data breaches reported in January 2015 resulted in the exposure of 455,337 
individual records. Of the remaining 75%, an unknown number of records were exposed 
(ITRC, 2015). Industries affected included banking, business, education, medical and 
healthcare, as well as government and military sectors (ITRC, 2015). During 2015, 1,670 
data breaches occurred with nearly 50% reporting an unknown number of compromised 
data records (Gemalto, 2016). By the end of May 2016, 42% of data breach incidents 
resulted in 12 million records compromised (ITRC, 2016). In addition, nearly 400 million 
email addresses and passwords of customers associated with LinkedIn and multiple email 
providers (i.e., Hotmail, Gmail, Mail.ru, etc.) were found available for sale online 
(Identity Force, 2016; Scott, 2016).  
 Prior research identified the need for research to address the threats to 
organizational IS due to vulnerabilities and breaches caused by employees (Choi et al., 
2013; Jensen et al., 2014; Peha, 2013). More than any other internal process or 
technology, breaches were discovered by users armed with the skills needed to quickly 
identify and report possible cyber-espionage occurrences (Verizon Enterprise Solutions, 
2014). Technology alone cannot guarantee security. A security risk is often accepted by a 
user when the countermeasure interferes with work productivity (Choi et al., 2013). 
Therefore, the human factor cannot be ignored in corporate security without peril 
(Kaspersky Lab, 2013). Most security incidents were attributed to everyday insiders like 
current or former employees (PwC, 2013). Since 2003, four of the top nine security 
indent patterns (e.g., miscellaneous errors, crimeware, insider misuse, & physical 
theft/loss) involved human error or misuse (Verizon Enterprise Solutions, 2015). 
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According to Symantec Corporation (2015), not all insider threats are intentional; 84% of 
insider related data breaches reported were due to an unintentional act or failure to secure 
a computer or drive. Of the 1,670 data breaches reported in 2015, 38% were due to an 
accidental loss or malicious insider (Gemalto, 2016). Moreover, it was noted that 
“unfortunately, even the best security mechanisms can be bypassed through social 
engineering” (Winkler & Dealy, 1995, p. 1), which “is now considered the great security 
threat to people and organizations” (Algarni et al., 2014, p. 1). Even amid those who 
classified themselves as being aware of social engineering techniques, Kvedar, Nettis, 
and Fulton (2010)’s findings suggested an implemented social engineering plot could 
succeed. A user with technology knowledge does not automatically become skilled in 
cybersecurity (Choi et al., 2013). In the work of Qin and Burgoon (2007), users had an 
18% accuracy in detecting deception. According to Enterprise Risk Management (ERM) 
(2014), not protecting an organization’s information puts “the reputation, success, and 
survival of the organization at risk” (p. 2). An example of this occurred in November 
2014 when Sony Pictures suffered a data breach that shut down all e-mail 
communications and computer usage due to a hacker posting a threatening message on 
company owned computers and obtaining unsecured data files (Privacy Rights 
Clearinghouse, 2014). Another data breach reported by Anthem identified hackers 
compromised work information system credentials of a system administrator, possibly 
through email phishing (Mathews & Yadron, 2015). Moreover, malware, use of stolen 
credentials, and phishing were identified as the top three cyber threats by Verizon 
Enterprise Solutions (2016). However, the skills needed to mitigate such cybersecurity 
threats and to protect corporate IT systems from such data breach attacks can be the 
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difference between experiencing a breach or not. It appears no one is immune from a 
cyber-attack (Verizon Enterprise Solutions, 2016). Thus, the importance of a measure to 
assess the level of cybersecurity skills held by a non-IT professional is significant. Table 
4 lists a summary of research studies regarding data breaches. 
Table 4 
 
Summary of Data Breaches 
Study Methodology Sample Instrument 
or Construct 
Main Finding or 
Contribution 
Algarni et al., 
2014 
Empirical 
study via 
qualitative 
survey 
78 social 
networking 
site (SNS) 
account 
holders 
Social 
engineering 
Social engineering 
is a threat to SNS 
account holders 
     
Boritz & No, 
2011 
Literature 
review and 
synthesis 
 Framework to 
identify key 
stakeholders 
and their 
interactions to 
structure e-
commerce 
privacy 
settings 
Previous studies on 
privacy settings in 
e-commerce have 
relied on opinions 
not actual behaviors 
and privacy of 
accumulated PII is 
an important 
growing issue 
     
Choi et al., 
2013 
Empirical 
study via 
expert 
reviewed 
survey 
185 
respondents 
from a large 
government 
transportation 
agency 
Cybersecurity 
threats and 
vulnerabilities 
End user awareness 
of monitoring and 
cybersecurity 
initiative skill 
reduced misuse 
intentions 
     
Jensen et al., 
2014 
Empirical 
study via 
laboratory 
experiment 
111 subjects Effect of color 
on key 
business 
information 
retention 
The use of color to 
highlight critical 
information (i.e., 
corporate security 
policies) does 
increase the end-
user’s retention of 
that information 
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Table 4 
 
Summary of Data Breaches (Cont.) 
Study Methodology Sample Instrument 
or Construct 
Main Finding or 
Contribution 
Kvedar et al., 
2010 
Empirical 
study via 
vulnerability 
assessment 
simulation 
Graduate, 
undergraduate, 
and high 
school 
students 
attending 
simulation 
Social 
engineering 
Over 40% did not 
perceive social 
engineering as a 
threat and 85% 
gave the attackers 
network 
information 
     
Qin & 
Burgoon, 
2007 
Experimental 
study via 
interviews 
122 
community 
members and 
undergraduate 
students 
Social 
engineering in 
a deception 
related setting 
Human judgment 
on deception is 
biased and 
inaccurate  
     
Winkler & 
Dealy, 1995 
Case study Compilation 
of large 
financial 
institutions 
Social 
engineering 
Social engineering 
attacks were 
successful due to 
low cybersecurity 
skills 
 
Social Engineering 
 Social engineering tends to be widely employed and very effective due to human 
nature’s frailties and lack of awareness of such dangers at various levels (Siponen, 2001). 
Social engineering is a method used by a hacker to navigate around technical security 
controls (Jenkins, 2013). A successful social engineering attack is defined as an art of 
manipulation, deception, or intrusion (Mitnick & Simon, 2002, 2005; Podhradsky, 
D’Ovidio, Engebretson, & Casey, 2013). Every organization has at least one individual 
susceptible to a social engineering attack (Mouton, Leenen, Malan, & Venter, 2014). An 
attack may be as easy as asking for the sensitive information and newer technologies are 
making it even easier (Podhradsky et al., 2013). The number of individuals that can be 
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targets of a social engineering attack increases as electronic computing devices prevail 
(Mouton et al., 2014). Moreover, social engineering threats are increasing due to new 
trends (e.g., Bring Your Own Device) and the use of mobile devices accessing WIS in 
insecure environments (i.e., cafés) (Krombholz, Hobel, Huber, & Weippl, 2015). Thus, 
examples of social engineering disconfirm the belief that technical security controls 
completely secure a system and the user must not be security conscious (Jenkins, 2013).  
 Vulnerabilities must be identified, assessed, and prioritized by IT management 
and individuals (Algarni et al., 2014; Goodman & Lin, 2007). Social engineering scams 
do not discriminate against an individual’s age, gender, or education level (Algarni et al., 
2015; Podhradsky et al., 2013). An individual’s knowledge and ability to identify a social 
engineering attack lowers a corporation’s access vulnerability (Goodman & Lin, 2007). 
However, most individuals in an organization have a willingness to be helpful and that 
creates opportunities for a successful social engineering attack (Goodman & Lin, 2007). 
Many social engineering techniques (e.g., phishing, identity theft, spamming, etc.) exist 
and are used to compromise IT, while attacking individuals or organizations (Algarni et 
al., 2014). Furthermore, susceptibility to fall victim to a social engineering attack was 
found higher for women and young adults (Algarni et al., 2015). Moreover, all education 
levels of non-IT professionals were found susceptible to social engineering victimization 
(Algarni et al., 2015). Successful social engineering attacks often involve human 
emotions of trust, fear of getting disciplined, compliance, and personal gain (Mitnick & 
Simon, 2002; Podhradsky et al., 2013). Thus, this study addressed the development of a 
social engineering countermeasure that does not extinguish the individual’s tendency to 
help (Goodman & Lin, 2007). Moreover, this study identified the cybersecurity skills 
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level of an individual without harm to any existing IT. Table 5 lists a summary of 
research studies regarding social engineering and the range of social engineering threats. 
Table 5 
 
Summary of Social Engineering 
Study Methodology Sample Instrument 
or Construct 
Main Finding or 
Contribution 
Jenkins, 2013 Empirical 
study via 
experiments  
2108 
participants 
from three 
studies 
Insider threats Demonstrated the 
importance 
understanding the 
risks of weak 
security behavior 
     
Podhradsky et 
al., 2013 
Empirical 
study via 
Xbox 360 
Elite 
3 user profiles 
on 1 Xbox 360 
Elite 
Social 
engineering, 
PII disclosure 
in virtual 
societies 
PII was exposed 
even though user 
profiles were 
deleted. 
     
Siponen, 2001 Theoretical  Information 
security 
awareness 
Dimensions of 
information 
security awareness 
and the respective 
target groups were 
identified 
 
Malware 
 According to International Business Machines (IBM) Global Technology Services 
(2014), ‘human error’ was identified as a contributing factor in over 95% of all security 
incidents investigated. Furthermore, an infected attachment or selecting an unsafe 
Uniform Resource Locator (URL) was the most prevalent contributing ‘human error’ 
when it comes to inflicting malware on computing systems (IBM Global Technology 
Services, 2014). Reported cases of malware attacks were not limited to one particular 
operating system (i.e., Windows, Mac, iOS, Android) (Chin, Felt, Sekar, & Wagner, 
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2012) or type of device (i.e., Automatic Teller Machine (ATM), computer, Point-of-Sale 
(POS) terminal, smartphone) (Choo, 2011). Chen, Gu, Zhuge, Nazario, and Han (2011) 
identified Web-based malicious software (malware) as an exploiter of client-side 
vulnerabilities, pervasive, and hard to block. Malware may also arrive via an e-mail 
attachment, which can lead to damaged computers, stolen personal information, and 
mount attacks on computers (Comesongsri, 2010). Provos, Rajab, and Mavrommatis 
(2009) discussed how an adversary sends a spam e-mail to a user, which then directs the 
user to a Webpage with malicious content. Malware infections occur mostly due to users 
lured to complete an action that leads to infecting their computer (Lévesque, Nsiempba, 
Fernandez, Chiasson, & Somayaji, 2013). A survey of 400 business executives and 
technology professionals identified that malware and hacking were top concerns within 
their organizations (CompTIA, 2015). Moreover, in the third quarter of 2014, an 
estimated 20 million new strands of malware were created (CompTIA, 2015). However, 
in the work of Harris, Furnell, and Patten (2014), approximately 6% of the non-IT 
participants surveyed were concerned with malware infections appearing on their mobile 
devices. This is alarming since both IT and non-IT participants failed to protect their 
mobile devices with anti-virus or firewall software (Harris et al., 2014). Min, 
Varadharajan, Tupakula, and Hitchens (2014) recommended at least one anti-virus 
software installation per device. However, Lévesque et al. (2013) found that 20% of the 
participants were infected with some type of malicious software that went undetected by 
the installed anti-virus software. Moreover, cyber criminals are focusing malicious 
software to attack mobile devices, which then weakens the corporate perimeter-based 
defenses as mobile devices are brought in and out of the work environment (He, 2013). 
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Malware delivery occurs in the form of an email attachment that included various file 
formats (Bere, Bhunu-Shava, Gamundani, & Nhamu, 2015). The flexibility for an end 
user to check email via a mobile device increases the risk of malware exposure. Thus, it 
appears that users with skills to prevent malware via e-mail or Webpages would reduce 
the number of infections. However, a tool to measure such skills does not appear to be 
reported in literature, especially of non-IT professionals. A summary of malware and the 
vastness of the threats associated with malware is shown in Table 6. 
Table 6 
 
Summary of Malware 
Study Methodology Sample Instrument 
or Construct 
Main Finding or 
Contribution 
Chen et al., 
2011 
Empirical study 
via prototype 
system 
26,498 
malicious 
scenarios 
from 1,248 
distinct sites 
Malware Developed and 
tested a prototype 
that allows review 
of malware trails 
     
Chin et al., 
2012 
Empirical study 
via structured 
interview and 
survey 
60 mobile 
device 
owners 
Privacy and 
security 
Smartphone 
owners were 
hesitant to 
complete sensitive 
tasks on their 
phones 
     
Comesongsri, 
2010 
Empirical study 
via pen and 
paper survey 
376 college 
students 
 
 
Theory of 
planned 
behavior, 
protection 
model theory, 
and discord  
Phishing 
protection 
intention  
     
He, 2013 Literature and 
blog mining 
review 
327 mobile 
social media 
security 
blogs 
Mobile social 
media risks 
and 
mitigation 
Mitigation 
techniques are 
needed to thwart 
cyber-attacks and 
threats via mobile 
social media 
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Table 6 
 
Summary of Malware (Cont.) 
Study Methodology Sample Instrument 
or Construct 
Main Finding or 
Contribution 
IBM, 2014 Empirical study 
via cyber-
attack event 
data 
Nearly 1,000 
clients in 
133 
countries 
Data breaches Human error 
contributed to over 
95% of the 
security events  
     
Lévesque et 
al., 2013 
Empirical study 
via real-world 
computer usage 
and diagnostics 
50 
participants 
recruited on 
a university 
campus 
Malware and 
anti-virus 
detection 
Anti-virus 
software does not 
detect all 
infections or 
threats to an IS 
     
Min et al., 
2014 
Empirical study 
via 
vulnerability 
testing 
10 antivirus 
software 
programs 
Malware 
detection 
After an antivirus 
update, a malware 
infection could 
occur due to a 
design 
vulnerability 
 
Personally Identifiable Information 
 PII is defined as information that 1) distinguishes or traces an individual’s 
identity, e.g., social security number, biometric records, date and place of birth, and 2) 
any data or information associated with an individual, including but not limited to 
medical, educational, financial, and employment (Krishnamurthy & Wills, 2009; U.S. 
Government Accountability Office (GAO), 2008). An exploitation of PII may occur with 
a user merely opening a file. Thus, organizations should be aware and isolate all PII 
available within their environment, including contractor sites and backup tapes 
(McCallister et al., 2010). Individuals participating online via social media are vulnerable 
to having their PII leaked to third parties (Krishnamurthy & Wills, 2009). Furthermore, 
the leaked PII may be collected and linked to other personal information, which may 
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result in PII theft (Malin, 2005; McCallister et al., 2010). Mitigation for protecting PII 
theft is heightened when corporations, e.g., Anthem, Target, Home Depot, etc., 
experience a data breach. Anthem experienced such a data breach in February 2015 and 
announced that names, social security numbers, birthdates, and addresses were stolen 
(Mathews & Yadron, 2015). South Koreans with higher education degrees were thought 
to fall victim to identity theft more often than those without degrees due to work related 
duties that involved online activities (Paek & Nalla, 2015). Identity theft was the cause of 
more than half (53.2%) of the 888 data breaches that occurred globally in the first half of 
2015 (Gemalto, 2015). Furthermore, the United States reported the highest number of 
incidents; a total of 671 data breaches (Gemalto, 2015). An example of this occurred in 
June 2015 when the Office of Personnel Management announced that PII of 21 million 
applicants and 1.1 million non-applicants (e.g., spouses and co-habitants) were part of 
two separate data breaches (U.S. Office of Personnel Management, 2015). This is 
alarming when prior research has found that as few as three pieces of personal 
information (date of birth, gender, & zip code) uniquely identify 87% of the United States 
population (Malin, 2005). 
 In a study of Facebook profiles, over time individuals shared less PII publicly and 
more privately to ‘friends’ (Stutzman, Gross, & Acquisti, 2012). In doing so, Facebook 
users shared more PII, sometimes unknowingly, to silent listeners (e.g., third party apps, 
advertisers) on the network (Malin, 2005; Stutzman et al., 2012). PII disclosure or theft 
may also occur from a trail of PII breadcrumbs collected from Web browsing and later 
reconstructed (Airoldi, Bai, & Malin, 2011). Even with the best security mechanisms, 
social engineering is a great security threat to PII (Algarni et al., 2014; Winkler & Dealy, 
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1995). A user with poor information sharing habits and practices increases risk of PII 
exposure (Ball, Ramim, & Levy, 2015). According to Heartfield and Loukas (2013), 90% 
of participants were deceived into executing malware that used their computer for 
collecting personal information. Thus, a measure to determine the participant’s skill level 
of detecting malware will assist in reducing not only an individual’s, but a corporation’s, 
vulnerability to PII theft via malware. Table 7 lists a summary of research studies 
regarding PII. 
Table 7 
 
Summary of Personally Identifiable Information 
Study Methodology Sample Instrument 
or Construct 
Main Finding or 
Contribution 
Airoldi et al., 
2011 
Empirical 
observations 
and 
controlled 
simulated 
study 
1226 patients 
from 231 
hospitals, 144 
individuals 
from 86 
households, 
1000 subjects 
for 
simulations 
Entropy 
metric for 
assessing 
disclosure risk 
of distributed 
databases 
Risk of trail 
disclosure and PII 
re-identification is 
driven by the 
quantity of PII 
distributed across 
databases.  
     
Algarni et al., 
2014 
Empirical 
study via 
qualitative 
survey 
78 social 
networking 
site (SNS) 
account 
holders 
Social 
engineering 
Social engineering 
is a threat to SNS 
account holders 
due to SNSs lack 
of mitigation 
techniques 
     
Ball et al., 
2015 
Empirical 
study via 
quantitative 
survey 
390 students 
and faculty 
members 
Personal 
information 
sharing 
awareness, 
habits, and 
practices 
Habits 
significantly 
influence 
practices, which 
may expose PII 
through social 
media and e-
learning systems  
40 
 
Table 7 
 
Summary of Personally Identifiable Information (Cont.) 
Study Methodology Sample Instrument 
or Construct 
Main Finding or 
Contribution 
Heartfield & 
Loukas, 2013 
Empirical 
study via 
experimental 
evaluation 
20 technically 
trained 
university 
students 
Phishing and 
file 
masquerading 
Technical end-to-
end security 
solutions in the 
cloud do not take 
the human element 
into consideration 
     
Krishnamurthy 
& Wills, 2009 
Empirical 
study via 
online social 
networks 
12 online 
social 
networks 
PII Online social 
networks directly 
and indirectly 
released PII to 
third parties 
     
Malin, 2005 Empirical 
study via 
URL access 
data 
86 households 
and 144 
individuals 
accessing 
66,000 
distinct Web 
pages 
Re-
identification 
Data trails from 
multiple Website 
visits, re-
identification was 
possible and 
revealed 
relationships 
between PII and 
unidentifiable data 
     
Paek & Nalla, 
2015 
Empirical 
study 
10,671 South 
Korean 
individuals 
aged 14 and 
older 
Korea Crime 
Victim 
Survey 
(KVCS) 2008 
Education level was 
positively 
correlated to 
identity theft 
victimizations 
     
Stutzman et 
al., 2012 
Empirical 
study via 
longitudinal 
panel 
5,076 
Facebook 
users 
Social 
network 
privacy and 
disclosure 
Although personal 
data shared publicly 
reduced, the 
quantity and score 
of personal data 
revealed privately 
increased 
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Table 7 
 
Summary of Personally Identifiable Information (Cont.) 
Study Methodology Sample Instrument 
or Construct 
Main Finding or 
Contribution 
Winkler & 
Dealy, 1995 
Case study Compilation 
of large 
financial 
institutions 
Social 
engineering 
Social engineering 
attacks were 
successful due to 
low cybersecurity 
skills 
 
 Phishing 
The term phishing was created by hackers describing the activity of stealing AOL 
account information in 1995 (James, 2005; Ryan, 1997). A typical phishing attack occurs 
when a victim receives a fraudulent e-mail disguised as a genuine e-mail asking the 
recipient to confirm pieces of personal information by clicking on a hyperlink. The 
hyperlink leads to the spoofed Website with matching images and logos that appears as 
genuine as the legitimate site. A successful phisher may steal valuable financial 
information, such as a social security number, bank account details, and credit card 
numbers (Huang, Ma, & Chen, 2011) by harvesting the information from the spoofed site 
and illegally using it (Davinson & Sillence, 2010). 
With detection occurring prior to the phished communication actually reaching 
the user, phishing detection methods (i.e., blacklists, whitelists, heuristics, DNS 
analyzers, Classifier System, Lookup System, or hybrids) are usually invisible to the user 
(Hajgude & Ragha, 2012). Furnell (2007) found that individuals were not attuned to 
observe the visual, technical, and language cues involved with phishing e-mails. 
According to Paek and Nalla (2015), each additional phishing attempt increased the odds 
of identity theft victimization by 2 percent. APWG (2010) and Phish Tank (2009) 
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identified threats to frequently targeted markets (auction, financial, payment services, & 
retail). APWG (2014) reported the same targeted markets plus the addition of ISPs, 
classifieds, gaming, government, and social media. Many approaches from artificial 
intelligence to SETA programs attempt to mitigate the challenge of cyber threats. 
Phishing may be compared to purse snatching. The threat of purse snatching has existed 
for as long as purses have existed, and yet, it occurs every day (Weber, 2012). Numerous 
attempts to solve the phishing threat exist and despite those efforts the user continues to 
fall victim to attacks. Thus, users with the skill to identify phishing attempts would 
reduce the loss of PII along with confidential corporate information. A summary of 
research studies regarding phishing and end user vulnerabilities are listed in Table 8. 
Table 8 
 
Summary of Phishing 
Study Methodology Sample Instrument 
or Construct 
Main Finding or 
Contribution 
Davinson 
& Sillence, 
2010 
Empirical 
study via 
experimental 
groups 
64 staff and 
students 
Health belief 
model  
Providing information 
about the risk 
involved improved 
security behavior 
     
Furnell, 
2007 
Empirical 
study 
415 Internet 
users 
Phishing End users cannot rely 
solely on technical, 
visual, and language 
cues of phishing 
messages 
     
Hajgude & 
Ragha, 
2012 
Literature 
review and 
synthesis 
 Phishing 
detection 
Proposed a phishing 
detection algorithm 
that combined 
blacklist, white list, 
and heuristic analysis  
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Table 8 
 
Summary of Phishing (Cont.) 
Study Methodology Sample Instrument 
or Construct 
Main Finding or 
Contribution 
Huang et 
al., 2011 
Conceptual 
paper 
 Phishing 
mitigation 
and one-time 
passwords 
Proposed 
authentication system 
to reduce phished 
login credentials 
     
Paek & 
Nalla, 
2015 
Empirical 
study 
10,671 South 
Korean 
individuals 
aged 14 and 
older 
Korea Crime 
Victim 
Survey 
(KVCS) 2008 
Identity theft 
victimization was 
correlated to number 
of phishing attempts 
received 
 
 Social Media 
 Social media networks have four essential features: “1) a digital profile, 2) search 
and privacy, 3) relational ties, and 4) network transparency” (Kane, Alavi, Labianca, & 
Borgatti, 2014, p. 284). Because users of e-mail or electronic discussion boards do not 
establish a profile, nor is searching or viewing a list of connections allowed by others, 
Kane et al. (2014)’s definition does not include e-mail or electronic discussion boards. 
Although social media networks provide many benefits, users suffer harm when their 
personal information is lost, stolen, or wrongly accessed (Romanosky, Hoffman, & 
Acquisti, 2013). According to Chhabra, Aggarwal, Benevenuto, and Kumaraguru (2011), 
the accessibility to a large group of gullible users on an open platform attracted 
adversaries to lure victims with shortened URLs within social media networks (i.e., 
Orkut, Habbo, & Facebook). Geographically, the USA was found among the targeted 
countries, while Facebook, Orkut, and Twitter combined accounted for two-thirds of 
phishing URLs from social media networks (Chhabra et al., 2011). A threat to social 
44 
 
media network users may be a vulnerable friend or other community attributes 
(Gundecha, Barbier, & Liu, 2011). Furthermore, Gundecha et al. (2011) identified that a 
user’s privacy was impacted by each new friend. Users were either not cautious or not 
aware of their friends’ security and privacy concerns (Gundecha et al., 2011). Protection 
for/from social media networks (i.e., Facebook & Twitter) was identified as an 
organization’s IT security weak spot by 763 IT security decision makers and practitioners 
representing 11 countries in North America and Europe (Cyberedge Group, 2014). 
Moreover, social engineering victimization may be predicted by a non-IT professional’s 
age, gender, security knowledge, and elapsed time in joining Facebook (Algarni et al., 
2015). Without social engineering skills (i.e., knowledge, experience, & abilities), 62.5% 
were victimized by a social engineering attack (Bullée, Montoya, Pieters, Junger, & 
Hartel, 2015). Thus, it appears skill in protecting PII via social media networks would 
assist in not only strengthening an individual’s identity, but also an organization’s IT 
security. A summary of research studies regarding social media and how it was 
introduced follows in Table 9. 
Table 9 
 
Summary of Social Media 
Study Methodology Sample Instrument 
or Construct 
Main Finding or 
Contribution 
Algarni et al., 
2015 
Empirical 
study  
7,540 
Facebook 
profile 
observations 
Social 
engineering  
Susceptibility to 
cybersecurity threat 
victimization 
predicted by 
demographics 
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Table 9 
 
Summary of Social Media (Cont.) 
Study Methodology Sample Instrument 
or Construct 
Main Finding or 
Contribution 
Bullée et al., 
2015 
Empirical 
study 
118 University 
building 
occupants 
Social 
engineering 
training 
Social engineering 
knowledge, 
experience, and 
abilities reduced the 
number of victims 
     
Chhabra et al., 
2011 
Empirical 
study via 
social media 
6,474  
shortened 
URLs directed 
to phished 
sites 
PII theft via 
social media 
and shortened 
URL services 
Phishers presented 
shortened URLs on 
social media to lure 
victims 
     
Cyberedge 
Group, 2014 
Empirical 
study via 
Web-based 
survey 
763 IT 
security 
decision 
makers and 
practitioners 
Cyber threats Potential insider 
threats and having 
the necessary tools 
to investigate 
security breaches 
were a higher 
concern than any 
external threat 
source 
     
Gundecha et 
al., 2011 
Empirical 
study via 
Facebook 
profiles 
100,000 
Facebook 
users 
Social media 
networks 
Introduced an 
approach to 
vulnerabilities that 
exist due to a 
friend’s security 
settings on social 
media site 
     
Kane et al., 
2014 
Theoretical  Social media 
networks 
Identified a 
framework for 
evaluating and 
discussing the use 
of social media in 
empirical research 
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Table 9 
 
Summary of Social Media (Cont.) 
Study Methodology Sample Instrument 
or Construct 
Main Finding or 
Contribution 
Romanosky et 
al., 2013 
Empirical 
analysis 
1,772 U.S. 
data breach 
observations 
Data breach 
litigation and 
settlement 
Lawsuits involving 
PII theft were 
settled more often 
than litigated 
 
Work Information Systems Security 
 Information systems are expected by society to “do what is required and expected 
of them despite environmental disruption, human user and operator errors, and attacks by 
hostile parties” (Goodman & Lin, 2007, p. 1). To address these expectations, user 
interfaces have seen updates to include security pop-up windows (Hong, 2012), inhibitive 
attractors (Bravo-Lillo et al., 2013), and domain-highlighting (Lin et al., 2011). Current 
or prior employees present the greatest security threat to WIS as accidental harm or 
exposure to external threats may occur due to lack of cybersecurity skills (Jacob & 
Antony, 2014). Organizations and individuals rely on the embedded security features of 
the IT products and services sold on the open market (Peha, 2013). The use of mobile 
devices has increased exploits in the workplace by 52% (PwC, 2016). Whitman (2004) 
noted that human error or failures were the highest threat to information security. Even 
with the best security mechanisms, a well-planned and executed social engineering attack 
could succeed (Kvedar et al., 2010; Winkler & Dealy, 1995). Information security 
incidents globally increased 38% in 2015 (PwC, 2016). Without a cybersecurity skilled 
workforce to combat cyber-attacks, a work information system’s vulnerability increases 
as the aggressive cybercriminals continue to escalate the frequency, severity, and impact 
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of cyber-attacks (PwC, 2016). Table 10 lists a summary of research studies regarding 
work information systems security and threat mitigation methods. 
Table 10 
 
Summary of Work Information Systems Security 
Study Methodology Sample Instrument 
or Construct 
Main Finding or 
Contribution 
Bravo-Lillo et 
al., 2013 
Empirical 
study via 
online hands-
on tasks 
A total of 
3,722 
Amazon’s 
Mechanical 
Turk workers 
over three 
experiments 
Security 
warning 
dialogue 
design  
Inhibitive attractors 
reduced the threat 
of end users 
installing 
illegitimate 
software, granting 
dangerously 
excessive 
permissions to PII 
online, and habitual 
ignoring of a 
familiar security 
warning 
     
Goodman & 
Lin, 2007 
Literature 
review and 
synthesis 
 Cybersecurity 
research 
Cybersecurity 
threats, 
vulnerabilities, and 
future research 
opportunities in the 
U.S. 
     
Hong, 2012 Literature 
review 
 Phishing History of phishing 
attacks and 
identified the 
importance of 
including the 
human element in 
researching 
solutions 
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Table 10 
 
Summary of Work Information Systems Security (Cont.) 
Study Methodology Sample Instrument 
or Construct 
Main Finding or 
Contribution 
Kvedar et 
al., 2010 
Empirical 
study via 
vulnerability 
assessment 
simulation 
Graduate, 
undergraduate, 
and high 
school 
students 
attending 
simulation 
Social 
engineering 
At a network 
vulnerability 
focused event, over 
40% did not 
perceive social 
engineering as a 
threat and 85% gave 
the attackers 
network information 
     
Lin et al., 
2011 
Empirical 
study via 
controlled 
experiment 
22 university 
students and 
staff 
Domain-
highlighting, 
phishing 
mitigation 
Phishing mitigation 
tools were not used 
at all times by end-
users 
     
Whitman, 
2004 
Empirical 
study via 
online survey 
192 top 
computing 
executives 
IS security 
threats 
Human error was 
among the dominant 
costs of 
unintentional IS 
security threats 
     
Winkler & 
Dealy, 1995 
Case study Compilation 
of large 
financial 
institutions 
Social 
engineering 
Social engineering 
was successful due 
to low cybersecurity 
skills 
 
 Confidential Information Exposure 
 One successful deployment of a social engineering technique is all it takes to 
compromise corporate information (McAfee Labs, 2014). The departments holding the 
most sensitive data were the least successful at detecting legitimate or illegitimate e-mail 
messages (McAfee Labs, 2014). In the work of Qin and Burgoon (2007), users detected 
deception with an 18% accuracy rate. Even among those who classified themselves as 
being aware of social engineering techniques, Kvedar et al. (2010)’s findings suggested 
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that an implemented social engineering plot could succeed. Social engineering can bypass 
even the best security mechanisms (Winkler & Dealy, 1995). The exposure of 
confidential information through social engineering is a great security threat to people 
and organizations (Algarni et al., 2014).  
 Social engineering is not the only threat to the exposure of confidential 
information. Confidential information disclosure may occur by an employee conducting 
unsecure activities, while at work or at home. One such example involves an investment 
specialist at Morgan Stanley that admitted to illegally downloading confidential 
information of about 350,000 clients; the details of how that information was uploaded to 
an open file sharing site is unknown (Baer, 2015). According to the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI)’s investigation of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)’s director, 
General David Petraeus, an employee in a classified position was performing unsecure 
Internet activities which heightened national security concerns (Barrett, Perez, & 
Gorman, 2012). The U.S. Department of State and the Broadcasting Board of Governors’ 
Office of Inspector General (OIG) (2012) reported the Ambassador of Kenya ordered a 
commercial Internet connection be installed in the bathroom of his embassy office in lieu 
of the secure Internet connection provided by the Department of State. Furthermore, the 
Ambassador demanded the information management staff use a commercial email system 
in lieu of the department email system (U.S. Department of State & the Broadcasting 
Board of Governors, 2012). Former Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton’s cybersecurity 
skill level was questioned while she explained the convenience of using a personal email 
address to conduct official government operations instead of a government issued email 
address (Clinton, 2015). Furthermore, an individual volunteering information on a social 
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networking Website (e.g., Facebook or MySpace) creates a social engineering 
vulnerability not only to the individual, but to their workplace and co-workers (Mills, 
2009). Each of these incidents were a breeding ground for potential confidential 
information exposure (Kozak, Iefremova, Szkola, & Sas, 2014; Spirin, 2014). Thus, it 
appears a measure to evaluate the user’s skill level at protecting confidential information 
will help to mitigate exposure and strengthen IT security. Moreover, reports of such a 
measure appears absent in literature, especially of non-IT professionals. Table 11 lists a 
summary of research studies regarding confidential information exposure. 
Table 11 
 
Summary of Confidential Information Exposure 
Study Methodology Sample Instrument 
or 
Construct 
Main Finding or 
Contribution 
Algarni et 
al., 2014 
Empirical 
study via 
qualitative 
survey 
78 social 
networking site 
(SNS) account 
holders 
Social 
engineering 
Social engineering is a 
threat to SNS account 
holders due to SNSs 
lack of mitigation 
techniques 
     
Kozak et 
al., 2014 
Empirical 
study 
26,937 email 
addresses from 
2,000 
published 
articles 
Sharing of 
email 
addresses 
Use of institutional 
email address may link 
an end-user to other 
PII, but the effect of 
using a non-
institutional email 
account for scholarly 
communications is 
unknown 
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Table 11 
 
Summary of Confidential Information Exposure (Cont.) 
Study Methodology Sample Instrument 
or 
Construct 
Main Finding or 
Contribution 
Kvedar et 
al., 2010 
Empirical 
study via 
vulnerability 
assessment 
simulation 
Graduate, 
undergraduate, 
and high 
school 
students 
attending 
simulation 
Social 
engineering 
At a network 
vulnerability focused 
event, over 40% did 
not perceive social 
engineering as a threat 
and 85% gave the 
attackers network 
information 
     
Qin & 
Burgoon, 
2007 
Experimental 
study via 
interviews 
122 
community 
members and 
undergraduate 
students 
Social 
engineering in 
a deception 
related setting 
Human judgment on 
deception is biased and 
inaccurate 
     
Winkler 
& Dealy, 
1995 
Case study Compilation 
of large 
financial 
institutions 
Social 
engineering 
Social engineering 
attacks were successful 
due to low 
cybersecurity skills 
 
 Password Exploitations 
 Since the 1960s, a common method of authentication is text-based passwords 
(Wilkes, 1968). In an evaluation of the Multics system, passwords were singled out as a 
weak point (Saltzer, 1974). Of the 621 confirmed data breaches and thousands of security 
incidents reported in 2013, 76% were due to weak or stolen credentials (Verizon 
Enterprise Solutions, 2013). According to Gaw and Felten (2006), a new password was 
not created for each new account; password reuse was increasing. In addition, online 
password management tools and accounts were found to contribute to poor password 
practices (Gaw & Felten, 2006). The creation of a digital identity ecosystem became a 
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national security priority for the U.S. Government in 2011 due to users accumulating 
online identities and having difficulty in managing their respective credentials (Bauer, 
Bravo-Lillo, Fragkaki, & Melicher, 2013). Moreover, the threat of a password 
exploitation was found with 61% of the IT and non-IT students surveyed as they allowed 
applications to store their authentication credentials (Harris et al., 2014). Furthermore, 
password exploitation threat was heighted with authentication credentials absent on 
nearly 72% of IT and non-IT student-owned smartphones, tablets, and laptops/PCs 
(Harris et al., 2014). 
 Ives, Walsh, and Schneider (2004) identified when users frequently re-use 
passwords, “a domino effect can result as one site’s password file falls prey to a hacker 
who then uses it to infiltrate other systems, potentially revealing additional password files 
that could lead to the failure of other systems” (p. 76). An end-user’s disregard of 
instructions to create a unique password for a Website increases the risk of password 
exploitations (Grimes, Marquardson, & Nunamaker, 2014). In October 2014, Dropbox 
clarified that a hacker attack may have stolen login credentials from other sites and 
attempted to use them to access Dropbox accounts (MacMillan & Yadron, 2014). Even 
though reusing login credentials makes it easier to remember account details, it places 
individuals and organizations at a greater security risk (MacMillan & Yadron, 2014). 
Verizon Enterprise Solutions (2014) reported a stolen password from a POS vendor was 
the same for each organization managed by the vendor. Armed with information of the 
vendor’s customer base, the attacker was then able to use the stolen password for gaining 
access and installing malicious code to capture transmitted data (Verizon Enterprise 
Solution, 2014). In October 2014, J. P. Morgan Chase & Company disclosed in a 
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regulatory filing that data related to 76 million households and 7 million small businesses 
were compromised (J. P. Morgan Chase & Company, 2014). It is suspected an 
employee’s personal computer infected with malware was the culprit that allowed 
intruders access to J. P. Morgan Chase & Company’s network via the employee’s virtual 
private network password (Glazer & Yadron, 2014). Of the financial malware gang 
incidents reported, 24% were due to the Dyre Wolf harvesting employee and customer 
credentials for access to “business banking, corporate banking, treasury management, and 
high-value accounts” (Kessem, 2016, p. 12). Thus, it appears skill in password usage 
would assist in protecting an organization’s information and enhance IT security. Table 
12 lists a summary of research studies regarding password exploitations. Table 12 lists a 
summary of research studies regarding password exploitations. 
Table 12 
 
Summary of Password Exploitations 
Study Methodology Sample Instrument 
or Construct 
Main Finding or 
Contribution 
Bauer et al., 
2013 
Empirical 
study via 
survey 
424 Amazon 
Mechanical 
Turk 
participants in 
three separate 
Human 
Intelligence 
Tasks 
PII and single 
sign-on 
Consent dialogs 
were ineffective as 
participants were 
unable to identify 
the PII data types 
passed to service 
providers 
     
Gaw & Felten, 
2006 
Empirical 
study via 
laboratory 
exercise and 
online survey 
58 completed 
online survey, 
49 completed 
laboratory 
exercise 
Management 
strategies of 
passwords for 
online 
accounts 
Poor password 
practices were 
identified as a result 
of the nature of 
online accounts and 
password 
management tool 
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Table 12 
 
Summary of Password Exploitations (Cont.) 
Study Methodology Sample Instrument 
or Construct 
Main Finding or 
Contribution 
Harris et al., 
2014 
Empirical 
study via two 
surveys 
227 IT and 
non-IT college 
students 
Security of 
mobile 
devices 
Lack of use and 
improper storing of 
authentication 
credentials 
heightened the risk 
of password 
exploitations 
     
Ives et al., 
2004 
Literature 
review and 
synthesis 
 Password 
reuse 
End-users reuse of 
passwords is a 
security threat and 
increases the 
vulnerability of 
each IS accessed 
with the same 
password 
     
Saltzer, 1974 Case study  Multics 
system 
Protected 
information was at 
risk of exposure 
due to nine 
identified design 
flaws  
 
 
Cybersecurity  
Cybersecurity is “the activity or process, ability or capability, or state whereby 
information and communications systems and the information contained therein are 
protected from and/or defended against damage, unauthorized use or modification, or 
exploitation” (National Initiative for Cybersecurity Careers and Studies (NICCS), 2014, 
Cybersecurity section, para. 1). Cybersecurity also includes the restoration of digital 
information and communications (Axelrod, 2006, p. 1). The International Organization 
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for Standardization (ISO) / International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) established 
ISO/IEC 27002 (2013) as the code of practice for organizations to apply information 
security controls. These information security controls include that employee education is 
conducted on a regular basis to ensure the appropriate information security skills and 
qualifications are maintained (ISO/IEC, 2013; Spruit & Röling, 2014). An end-user 
without the skill to use a cybersecurity tool or an unusable cybersecurity tool translates 
into a potential information security breach (Nurse, Creese, Goldsmith, & Lamberts, 
2011). Therefore, including the human and social aspects in the cybersecurity system 
development processes encourages cybersecurity tool usage (Nurse et al., 2011).  
The protection of information remains in the most vulnerable spot (Mitnick & 
Simon, 2002). Humans, despite their intellect, are the most severe threat to an 
individual’s security (Mitnick & Simon, 2002). Information is valuable and knowledge 
protects information from progressively sophisticated cybersecurity threats (ERM, 2014). 
Therefore, cybersecurity skills correspond to an individual’s technical knowledge, ability, 
and experience surrounding the hardware and software required to execute IS security 
(Choi et al., 2013). Limited cybersecurity skills contribute to the behavior of users that 
causes human errors, often times unintentional (Choi, 2013). Furthermore, the need for 
users to demonstrate cybersecurity skills is not limited to a single occupation or 
profession (Burley et al., 2014). Likewise, a technology savvy user does not 
automatically make a cybersecurity savvy user (Choi et al., 2013). Thus, it appears that a 
non-IT professional with limited cybersecurity skills presents opportunities for 
organizational information vulnerabilities and threats (Thomson & von Solms, 2005). 
Table 13 lists a summary of research studies regarding cybersecurity. 
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Table 13 
 
Summary of Cybersecurity 
Study Methodology Sample Instrument 
or Construct 
Main Finding or 
Contribution 
Axelrod, 
2006 
Literature 
review and 
synthesis 
 Cybersecurity 
and critical 
infrastructure 
Defines cybersecurity 
and provides 
recommendations for 
protecting the critical 
infrastructure 
     
Burley et al., 
2014 
Literature 
review and 
synthesis 
 Cybersecurity 
professionalism 
All employees, IT 
and non-IT, need 
cybersecurity skills 
     
Choi, 2013 Empirical 
study via 
Web-based 
survey 
185 working 
professionals 
at a U.S. 
government 
agency 
Cybersecurity 
threats and 
vulnerabilities 
Cybersecurity 
skills reduce an 
end user’s 
computer misuse 
intention 
     
Choi et al., 
2013 
Empirical 
study via 
expert 
reviewed 
survey 
185 
respondents 
from a large 
government 
transportation 
agency in a 
Northeastern 
U.S. 
metropolitan 
Cybersecurity 
threats and 
vulnerabilities 
End user 
awareness of 
policies increased 
cybersecurity 
action skills 
     
Nurse et al., 
2011 
Literature 
review and 
synthesis 
 Cybersecurity 
usability and 
human-
computer 
interaction and 
security 
Guidelines for 
extending ISO/IEC 
27002 into 
measuring the 
usability of a 
cybersecurity tool 
     
Spruit & 
Röling, 2014 
Development 
research 
 Information 
Security Focus 
Area Maturity 
Model 
(ISFAM) 
ISFAM enables an 
organization to set 
up and measure its 
current information 
security maturity 
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Cybersecurity Skills Shortage 
 A strong security posture cannot exist without a team of security professionals to 
combat the organization’s “complex and serious internal and external threats” (Ponemon 
Institute, 2014b, p. 2). And yet, Ponemon Institute (2014b) found the IT security function 
understaffed at 70% of organizations surveyed. People that want to use their 
cybersecurity skills for good and not evil are difficult to locate (Rastello & Smialek, 
2013). Furnell and Moore (2014) found that 57% of digital leaders surveyed indicated 
enhanced IT skills are needed in the existing workforce. Thus, suggesting that there is a 
notable gap between actual IT skills within organizations and those IT skills believed to 
be needed (Furnell & Moore, 2014). IS security positions are predicted to grow 37% from 
2012 to 2022 (U.S. Department of Labor, 2014). According to the commissioner for the 
Air Force Association’s CyberPatriot contest, feeding the technical workforce starts with 
getting teenagers excited about science, technology, engineering, and math (STEM) in 
middle school; waiting until high school was too late (Rastello & Smialek, 2013). Nearly 
3,900 young adults, ages 18 to 26, from 12 different countries want jobs using cyber 
skills, but 58% were not taught cybersecurity skills in the classroom (Raytheon - National 
Cyber Security Alliance (NCSA), 2015). An average of 22 staff members were reported 
in an IT security function in 2013 with an expected growth to an average of 29 members 
in 2014 (Ponemon Institute, 2014b). The increase need of workers with cybersecurity 
skills is likely to persist at least until education and training catch up (Burning Glass 
Technologies, 2015). 
 The demand for employees with skills to protect computer networks and the 
information contained within those systems will continue to rise as cyber-attacks increase 
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(U.S. Department of Labor, 2014). Furthermore, hackers have the skills and tactics to 
exploit the vulnerabilities of individuals, industries, or governments conducting 
transactions online (Cox, 2015). “As long as the threat exists, there would seem to be 
sufficient demand for cybersecurity services” (Libicki et al., 2014, p. 76). In addition to 
the persistent threat, the government’s interest in cybersecurity is a major driver in the 
demand for those with cybersecurity skills (Libicki et al., 2014). In an attempt to recruit 
and retain professionals with cybersecurity skills, the U.S. Senate unanimously passed 
Senate Bill 1691 (2014) to grant the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) the 
authority to hire qualified experts in an expedited manner at a competitive salary, as well 
as more benefits and incentives (Chabrow, 2014). People with good cybersecurity skills 
may be used in many related specialties; all do not obtain a computer science degree 
(Libicki et al., 2014). Cybersecurity is not exclusively a technical undertaking; an 
effective national cybersecurity workforce requires a vast range of backgrounds and skills 
(National Research Council (NRC), 2013). Furthermore, information security 
practitioners were resistant of attempts to isolate cybersecurity into a single profession in 
the United Kingdom (Reece & Stahl, 2015). Cybersecurity is a people problem, which 
requires a people solution (Spidalieri & Kern, 2014). One of the main initiatives of The 
Comprehensive National Cybersecurity Initiative (CNCI) is to encourage the expansion 
of cyber education by developing a cyber-skilled workforce, while establishing an 
effective pipeline for future employees (U.S. National Security Council, 2011). 
Interviews with self-proclaimed hackers identified the importance of the public in 
defending against cyber terrorism (Cox, 2015). There is a “demand for skilled workers to 
secure critical infrastructure and cyberspace” (Spidalieri & Kern, 2014, p. 1). 
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Furthermore, identifying an individual’s poor security practices will assist in 
strengthening the United States’ collective defense against cyber terror (Cox, 2015). 
Thus, this study assisted in the identification and measurement of cyber-skilled 
individuals. A summary of research studies regarding cybersecurity skills shortage 
follows in Table 14. 
Table 14 
 
Summary of Cybersecurity Skills Shortage 
Study Methodology Sample Instrument 
or Construct 
Main Finding or 
Contribution 
Cox, 2015 Website 
reviews and 
interviews 
Several hundred 
terrorism 
Websites and 
43 self-
proclaimed 
hacker 
interviews 
Cyber 
terrorism 
Cybersecurity 
skilled 
individuals assist 
in  strengthening 
the U.S.’ defense 
against cyber 
terror  
     
Furnell & 
Moore, 2014 
Empirical 
study via 
survey 
419 respondents 
from a UK 
science and 
technology 
showcase event 
Security 
literacy 
Initiatives are 
needed to 
improve security 
literacy (i.e., 
cybersecurity 
skills)   
     
Libicki et al., 
2014 
Literature 
review and 
analysis 
 Cybersecurity 
manpower 
There is a high 
demand for 
cybersecurity 
experts in 
industry as well 
as the 
government 
     
Reece & 
Stahl, 2015 
Empirical 
study via 
interviews 
18 UK 
information 
security 
practitioners 
Professionalization 
of information 
security 
Practitioners are 
resistant of 
attempts to the 
professionalization 
of information 
security. 
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Cybersecurity Risk Mitigation and Tools 
 Cybersecurity involves both technical and human ability “to protect or defend 
against cyber-attacks” (CNSS, 2010, p. 22). Risk is defined as “a measure of the extent to 
which an entity is threatened by a potential circumstance or event, and typically a 
function of: (i) the adverse impacts that would rise if the circumstance or event occurs; 
and (ii) the likelihood of occurrence” (NIST, 2006). Therefore, cybersecurity risk 
describes any disruption of operations and monetary loss caused by a malicious cyber 
event (Mukhopadhyay et al., 2013; NIST, 2014). An organization or individual 
“prioritizing, evaluating, and implementing the appropriate risk-reducing 
controls/countermeasures recommended from the risk management process” (CNSS, 
2010, p. 62) is defined as risk mitigation. According to Maxion and Reeder (2005), risk 
mitigation is necessary to protect IS systems as humans making mistakes compromise IS 
security. These mistakes include unprotected sensitive files, erroneously configured 
systems, and mistakenly sending clear text to correspondents (Maxion & Reeder, 2005). 
Malware as an attack tool appears in many forms, i.e., trojans, virus, worms, rogueware, 
and is delivered through spam, phishing, and drive-by downloads; each of which involves 
human interaction (Jang-Jaccard & Nepal, 2014). Moreover, according to Jang-Jaccard 
and Nepal (2014), common hardware attacks involved hardware trojans, illegal clones, 
and side channel attacks, i.e., snooping hardware signals. Whereas, common software 
attacks included software programming bugs (e.g., memory management, user input 
validation, race conditions, user access privileges, etc.). Likewise, networking protocol 
attacks and network monitoring and sniffing were the most common network attacks 
(Jang-Jaccard & Nepal, 2014). As technologies (e.g., social media, cloud computing, 
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critical infrastructure, embedded systems & sensors, etc.) emerge, the need to mitigate 
cybersecurity threats and vulnerabilities increases (Jang-Jaccard & Nepal, 2014; 
Ransbotham, Mitra, & Ramsey, 2012). In response to the cybersecurity threats “placing 
the Nation’s security, economy, and public safety and health at risk” (NIST, 2014, p. 1), 
President Obama issued an Executive Order No. 13,636 (2013) to address the need for 
improving the critical infrastructure systems. Executive Order No. 13,636 (2013) 
established that “the policy of the United States to enhance the security and resilience of 
the Nation’s critical infrastructure and to maintain a cyber-environment that encourages 
efficiency, innovation, and economic prosperity while promoting safety, security, 
business confidentiality, privacy, and civil liberties” (p. 11739). Furthermore, the 
Executive Order 13,636 (2013) summons for the making of the ‘Cybersecurity 
Framework’ that includes “a set of standards, methodologies, procedures, and processes 
that align policy, business, and technological approaches to address cyber risks” (p. 
11741).  
 Through government and private sector collaboration, NIST (2014) created a 
common language, cost effective, non-regulatory ‘Cybersecurity Framework’ that 
addresses and manages cybersecurity risk. According to NIST (2014), the ‘Framework’ is 
to complement, not replace, an organization’s risk mitigation and cybersecurity program. 
Based on the existing standards, guidelines, and practices, the ‘Framework’ is scalable 
and evolving as technology advances and business requires (NIST, 2014). It is 
technology neutral to provide a flexible and risk-based implementation that may be used 
with a broad array of cybersecurity risk management processes (NIST, 2014). The 
‘Framework Core’ consists of five functions identified by industry as helpful in 
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managing cybersecurity risk (NIST, 2014). These functions (Identify, Protect, Detect, 
Respond, & Recover) assist management of cybersecurity activities at their highest level 
(NIST, 2014). As described in NIST (2014), the functions may be performed 
simultaneously and continuously to build an operational culture that tackles the dynamic 
cybersecurity risk. To grant discussion on how this research fits within the Cybersecurity 
Framework, each function definition follows. 
• Identify – Develop the organizational understanding to manage cybersecurity 
risk to systems, assets, data, and capabilities, i.e., asset management, business 
environment, governance, risk assessment, and risk management strategy; 
• Protect – Develop and implement the appropriate safeguards to ensure 
delivery of critical infrastructure services, i.e., access control, awareness and 
training, data security, information protection processes and procedures, 
maintenance, and protective technology; 
• Detect – Development and implement the appropriate activities to identify the 
occurrence of a cybersecurity event, i.e., anomalies and events, security 
continuous monitoring, and detection processes;  
• Respond – Develop and implement the appropriate activities to take action 
regarding a detected cybersecurity event, i.e., response planning, 
communications, analysis, mitigation, and improvements; 
• Recover – Develop and implement the appropriate activities to maintain plans 
for resilience and restore any capabilities or services that were impaired due to 
a cybersecurity event, i.e., recovery planning, improvements, and 
communications. (NIST, 2014, pp. 8-9) 
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The five core functions’ concurrent and continual cyclical nature are represented in 
Figure 2.  
 
Figure 2. NIST’s cybersecurity framework functions 
 A human element exists in each function. Thus, the CSI benchmarking index 
assists in identifying cybersecurity skills of non-IT professionals by providing scenarios-
based, hands-on tasks to measure those skills. This identification assists in protecting the 
cybersecurity risk areas. Individuals not scoring at an acceptable competency threshold 
level may be restricted access until the necessary skills are identified above the 
acceptable competency threshold level measured by the CSI. An individual with 
cybersecurity skills demonstrates through the CSI benchmarking index the skills 
necessary in detecting anomalies and malicious cybersecurity events in a timely manner. 
Furthermore, the CSI benchmarking index documents the individual’s existing skills and 
competencies levels in responding to a set of cybersecurity tasks. Over time as an 
individual obtains additional knowledge, experience, and ability, the individual’s skills 
levels increase, and ultimately their competency is achieved (Eschenbrenner & Nah, 
2014; Marcolin et al., 2000). Therefore, the CSI assists in the continuous monitoring of 
cybersecurity skills needed to mitigate and recover from cybersecurity risks, which 
Identify
Protect
Detect
Respond
Recover
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encourages a strong critical infrastructure. Moreover, the CSI benchmarking index 
promotes the adoption of the ‘Cybersecurity Framework’ (PwC, 2014). Table 15 lists a 
summary of cybersecurity risk mitigation and tools. 
Table 15 
 
Summary of Cybersecurity Risk Mitigation and Tools 
Study Methodology Sample Instrument 
or Construct 
Main Finding or 
Contribution 
Eschenbrenner 
& Nah, 2014 
Literature 
review and 
synthesis 
 IS user 
competency, 
social 
cognitive 
theory 
Developed a 
conceptual 
foundation of IS 
user competency 
and proposed an IS 
user competency 
framework 
     
Jang-Jaccard 
& Nepal, 2014 
Literature 
review and 
synthesis 
 Cybersecurity 
vulnerabilities 
and emerging 
threats 
Mitigation of 
cybersecurity 
threats should 
include all levels 
(e.g., IT & non-IT 
professionals) of 
end-users 
     
Marcolin et 
al., 2000 
Empirical 
study via 
survey and 
flash-card 
self-efficacy 
assessment 
66 university 
administrators 
and students 
End-user 
competency 
End-users 
demonstrated less 
competence than 
their perceived 
ability to use a 
software package  
     
Maxion & 
Reeder, 2005 
Empirical 
study via 
laboratory 
study 
24 university 
students and 
research staff 
Human error, 
file-
permission 
settings 
Human error in 
file-permission 
settings were 
mitigated with an 
user-interface 
designed with the 
external sub-goal 
support design 
principle 
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Table 15 
 
Summary of Cybersecurity Risk Mitigation and Tools (Cont.) 
Study Methodology Sample Instrument 
or Construct 
Main Finding or 
Contribution 
Ransbotham 
et al., 2012 
Empirical 
analysis  
333 exploited 
vulnerabilities 
from three 
databases 
Exploitations 
of 
vulnerabilities 
by attackers 
Vulnerabilities 
disclosed through 
markets reduces 
attack penetration, 
risk, and volume 
 
 
Summary of What is Known and Unknown 
 A review of various aspects of skills, cybersecurity, and data breaches was 
conducted to provide the foundation for this research study. A description of what is 
known and unknown is provided with this literature review. Through this review of the 
literature, various data breaches and skills were identified as they relate to cybersecurity. 
Moreover, it was found that cybersecurity skills are fundamental as a risk mitigation tool 
and yet there is a cybersecurity skills shortage among non-IT professionals.  
 Skills are acquired in a three stage incremental learning process (Anderson, 1982; 
Gravill et al., 2006). The maturing of knowledge also improves an individual’s skills, 
which develops user competency (Toth & Klein, 2014; Rubin & Dierdorff, 2009). When 
measuring an individual’s skills, Gravill et al. (2006) as well as Torkzadeh and Lee 
(2003) cautioned that individuals did not accurately self-report or perceive their actual 
skill levels. Prior literature (i.e., Katz, 1974; Swanson, 2004) identified the effectiveness 
of hands-on tasks for increasing employee’s skills. Levy and Ramim (2015) found 
students with hands-on experience (i.e., computer simulation) performed better than those 
without. In the work of Vassiliou et al. (2014), observable hands-on skills were found to 
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provide an unbiased evidence of competence required in the medical and health 
profession. The use of scenario-based, hands-on skill assessments found in the aviation, 
medical, and transportation appears applicable to cybersecurity skills of non-IT 
professionals. A benchmarking index to hierarchically aggregate the set of SMEs 
identified cybersecurity skills using observable hands-on tasks appears to be absent from 
literature. Thus, this research study designed, developed, and empirically tested a 
benchmarking index to hierarchically aggregate the set of SMEs identified cybersecurity 
skills using observable hands-on tasks. Furthermore, the benchmarking index 
operationalized into an iPad app that assesses the cybersecurity skills level of non-IT 
professionals.  
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Chapter 3 
Methodology 
 
Overview of Research Design 
 This research study was classified as a developmental research. Developmental 
research tries to answer how the construction of a ‘thing’ addresses a problem (Ellis & 
Levy, 2009). Richey and Klein (2014) defined developmental research as a way to 
“create knowledge grounded in data systematically derived from practice” (p. 1). 
According to Ellis and Levy (2009), developmental research is comprised of three major 
elements: 1) product criteria is established and validated; 2) process for product 
development is accepted and formalized; as well as 3) determination of the product’s 
criteria is met through a formalized, accepted process. In the work of Tracey and Richey 
(2007), a systematic process was used to develop and then validate their model using the 
Delphi technique where an expert panel analyzed along with offering feedback on the 
proposed design. After suggested revisions were analyzed and incorporated, their model 
was validated by the Delphi technique (Tracey, 2009). Figure 3 illustrates the research 
design this study followed. To begin Phase One, the site approval letter and Institutional 
Review Board (IRB) approval were obtained as seen in Appendices A and B, 
respectively. Thus, Phase One of this developmental research study utilized an expert-
review process following the Delphi technique to design and validate the scenarios-based, 
hands-on benchmarking index for measuring cybersecurity skills (Ramim & Lichvar, 
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2014). Therefore, Phase Two of this study operationalized the previously developed and 
validated scenarios-based, hands-on benchmarking index into an iPad app that was used 
to assess the cybersecurity skills of non-IT professionals. Furthermore, Phase Three of 
this research study used the previously developed and validated iPad app to conduct a 
quantitative empirical study by collecting data from 188 non-IT professionals and 
documenting the results of the measure. The main research question that this study 
addressed is: What tasks enable the validation of a hierarchical measure for observable 
cybersecurity skills of non-IT professionals? A group of 188 non-IT professionals were 
contacted to empirically test the developed CSI. 
 
Figure 3. Overview of the Research Design Process 
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Instrument Development 
Choi (2013) recognized the lack of research involving cybersecurity skills, and 
the need for a measure to assess cybersecurity skills. Furthermore, Choi (2013) identified 
self-reported surveys as a limitation of research due to a participant’s reluctance to report 
actual misuse behavior. Whereas, Torkzadeh and Lee (2003) cautioned self-reported 
perceived skills do not always correspond to the individual’s actual skills. In the work of 
Gravill et al. (2006), the use of paper versus computer self-reported evaluative measures 
varied more in accuracy than self-reported factual information, i.e., years of experience. 
Xu and Yeh (2012) adjusted for the varying individualities of the assessors that may 
create biases in the self-assessment process. Weigel and Hazen (2014) argued that 
practitioners needed an instrument that would measure both perceived and actual 
technical skills of employees. Senior executives are a critical element to promoting safe 
computing practices to employees (Tarafdar, D’Arcy, Turel, & Gupta, 2015). The U.S. 
National Security Council has developed CNCI, and one of its main initiatives is to: 
Initiative #8: Expand cyber education. While billions of dollars are being spent 
on new technologies to secure the U.S. Government in cyberspace, it is the people 
with the right knowledge, skills, and abilities to implement those technologies 
who will determine success. However, there are not enough cybersecurity experts 
within the Federal Government or private sector to implement the CNCI, nor is 
there an adequately established Federal cybersecurity career field. Existing 
cybersecurity training and personnel development programs, while good, are 
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limited in focus and lack unity of effort. In order to effectively ensure our 
continued technical advantage and future cybersecurity, we must develop a 
technologically-skilled and cyber-savvy workforce and an effective pipeline of 
future employees. It will take a national strategy, similar to the effort to upgrade 
science and mathematics education in the 1950’s, to meet this challenge. (U.S. 
National Security Council, 2011, para. 17)  
Yet, the existing measures of cybersecurity skills are dated and limited. Additional work 
is needed to develop a measure based on scenarios that emulate real-life cases of 
cybersecurity attacks. Moreover, with the shift from desktop to laptop computers, and in 
the past decade to mobile devices, there is a need to ensure such measures are not tied to 
specific platform and/or operating system. Therefore, this study began by developing a 
list of the top platform independent skills that form a basis for the set of scenarios that 
capture potential cybersecurity threats.  
 With the vast shift into mobile computing and the seamless move between devices 
that the majority of current employees are engaged in, a critical need emerges to ensure 
that prior to uncovering the list of the skills, a set of platform independent threats were 
identified. A list of matching skills needed by non-IT professionals were then developed 
that formed the foundation for the development of the specific scenarios. For example, 
the threat of malware via e-mail attachment can be evaluated via an activity within an e-
mail attack scenario that provides participants with a list of e-mails in an inbox asking 
them to identify potential harmful messages and measure how many of these they 
identify. Another example of an activity within the e-mail attack scenario is to present 
participants with two e-mail messages from a bank, asking them to identify the one that is 
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a hoax and the one that is real, while asking them to identify all the indicators that 
triggered the suspicion of the hoax e-mail. As such, this study was set to develop a tool to 
assess the observable hands-on, scenarios-based cybersecurity skills of non-IT 
professionals. Figure 4 illustrates the four step development process of the CSI. Whereas, 
additional information about the process of using the developed tool to collect and score 
the performances on the cybersecurity skills of non-IT professionals is provided in 
succeeding sections. 
 
Figure 4. CSI development process 
 
Expert Panel 
 Content validity is established with literature reviews, pre-testing, and expert 
panels (Straub, 1989). An expert possesses skills, (i.e., knowledge, experiences, & 
abilities) in a particular field or domain (Lichvar, 2011). Furthermore, an expert panel can 
attest to how well “the measure includes an adequate and representative set of items that 
tap the concept” (Sekaran & Bougie, 2013, p. 226). When judgmental information is 
essential, prior research has employed the Delphi technique (Okoli & Pawlowski, 2004; 
Ramim & Lichvar, 2014). Using the Delphi technique provides a method for consensus-
building without direct confrontation among the experts (Dalkey & Helmer, 1963). 
Characterized as an iterative group communication process, the Delphi technique allows 
for experts to address complex problems in an effective manner (Okoli & Pawlowski, 
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2004; Ramim & Lichvar, 2014; Scheele, 1975). Prior research, e.g., Brancheau and 
Wetherbe (1987), as well as Schmidt, Lyytinen, Keil, and Cule (2001), utilized the 
Delphi technique for forecasting, issue identification, and concept/framework 
development. In addition, the Delphi technique ensures both reliability and validity as it 
exposes the study to a panel of differing, and often contradictory, opinions while seeking 
convergence through SMEs’ feedback (McFadzean, Ezingeard, & Birchall, 2011; 
Schmidt et al., 2001). Thus, this study followed the Delphi technique for the purpose of 
identifying the indispensable expert opinion of cybersecurity threats and related skills 
(Ramim & Lichvar, 2014).  
 Key features that are regarded as the Delphi technique include anonymity, 
iteration, controlled feedback, and statistically clustering the responses (Rowe & Wright, 
1999; Skinner, Nelson, Chin, & Land, 2015). Anonymity was maintained in this study 
with the use of Web-based questionnaires. Between each iteration, feedback was 
controlled by incorporating the SMEs’ responses into the next iteration of the Delphi 
technique data collection. Therefore, once this study identified the top platform 
independent threats and related cybersecurity skills for mitigating those threats, 
scenarios-based, hands-on tasks were developed for establishing the CSI. Prior to data 
collection, the tasks utilized to measure each respective skill of the CSI were presented to 
a panel of eight experts in the cybersecurity field for review and validation. These experts 
were recruited from industry and government agencies specializing in cybersecurity. The 
expert recruitment email may be seen in Appendix C. All suggested changes received 
from the panel’s review were addressed and incorporated into the iPad app. The tasks 
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were then presented to the panel as an iteration of the Delphi technique. Appendix D 
provides the expert qualitative and quantitative questionnaire. 
Scenario Method 
 A hypothetical scenario method is “also known as a vignette or policy capturing 
method” (Siponen & Vance, 2010, p. 492). With this method, each participant is 
presented with “written descriptions of realistic situations and then requested responses 
on a number of rating scales” (Trevino, 1992, p. 127-128). According to Hu et al. (2011), 
individuals are naturally unwilling to report their actual criminal or deviant behavior. But, 
participants view scenarios as unintimidating and nonintrusive (D’Arcy et al., 2009). 
Therefore, business, criminology, IS, and medical scholars have resorted to the use of 
scenarios to elicit input from participants (Hovav & D’Arcy, 2012; Hu et al., 2011; 
Kushniruk, Triola, Borycki, Stein, & Kannry, 2005). A scenario method was the most 
used methodology in 55% of the 174 ethical decision-making articles reviewed by 
O’Fallon and Butterfield (2005). Certification or specialist exams utilize a scenario-based 
and/or hands-on tasks to test the candidate’s skills (Furnell, 2004). Moreover, scenario-
based assessments are utilized throughout industry and the military to measure skills 
(Thomas & Lee, 2015; Wesolek, 2009). Antisocial and ethical/unethical behavior 
assessment is commonly assessed with scenario-based methods (Siponen & Vance, 
2010). A scenario method was utilized to simulate two real cases of compromised critical 
information systems in part of measuring the participant’s abuse intent (Kim, Park, & 
Baskerville, 2016). Therefore, consistent with prior IS research (i.e., D’Arcy et al., 2009; 
Hovav & D’Arcy, 2012; Vance, Siponen, & Pahnila, 2012), the designed scenarios 
presented in this study represent realistic and commonplace situations to the participants. 
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Hands-on Tasks and Skill Assessments 
 Hands-on skill assessments are a substantial part of the medical academic 
community (Berendonk et al., 2013). Skill assessments are completed through the 
observation of demonstrated hands-on tasks (Vassiliou et al., 2014). Scenario-based, 
hands-on tasks are used to measure a driver’s skills without causing harm to individuals, 
damage to vehicles, or inaccurate self-perceived responses (Sahami & Sayed, 2013; 
Sundström, 2011). Moreover, aviation academic curriculum utilizes scenario-based, 
hands-on assessments to measure pilots’ skills as mandated by the Federal Aviation 
Administration (FAA) (Thomas & Lee, 2015). The importance of skills and hands-on 
skills assessment found in the aviation, healthcare, and transportation industries appear 
applicable to cybersecurity skills as well. Torkzadeh and Lee (2003) used self-reported 
surveys to research the individual’s perception of his or her skills and cautioned that 
perceived skills do not always correspond to actual skills. In the work of Gravill et al. 
(2006), users inaccurately assessed their knowledge of a specific software package. Prior 
literature addressed the flaws and consequences of erroneous self-assessment reporting 
(Mann, 2010; Weigel & Hazen, 2014; Xu & Yeh, 2012). Thus, this study established a 
validated set of observable hands-on, scenarios-based tasks that measure cybersecurity 
skills of non-IT professionals without the bias of or need for self-assessment.  
MyCyberSkills™ iPad App Development 
 The CSI includes a set of hands-on tasks that measure the actual cybersecurity 
skills level of non-IT professionals. With the use of literature, (i.e., Mathews & Yadron, 
2015; Yadron et al., 2014), a scenario starts each task. Each skill included a group of four 
cybersecurity related hands-on tasks for the non-IT professional to identify and 
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demonstrate their skill level as if in a real-life situation (Hovav & D’Arcy, 2012; Vance 
et al., 2012). The MyCyberSkills™ prototype operationalized the previously developed 
and validated scenarios-based, hands-on benchmarking index into an iPad app that was 
used to assess the cybersecurity skills of non-IT professionals. The conceptual design of 
the CSI as it is presented within the MyCyberSkills™ iPad app is exhibited in Figure 5.  
 
Figure 5. Conceptual design of the CSI operationalized within the MyCyberSkills™ iPad 
App Prototype 
 
 Each of the cybersecurity related tasks were presented individually in the 
MyCyberSkills™ iPad app. Once task one of a skill was completed, scenario two was 
presented. Task two then incremented in difficulty and presents the non-IT professional 
again with four response options. As the non-IT professional responds to each hands-on 
observable task, the MyCyberSkills™ iPad app recorded the non-IT professional’s 
performance level using a scale of 0 to 10 and then presented the next cybersecurity 
related task. According to Schwartz and Fischer (2004), an individual cannot solve a 
problem that exceeds the individual’s highest developed skill level. Therefore, the level 
of difficulty increased as each task was presented within the respective skill. This 
presentation continued measuring the non-IT professionals’ skills with an easy, 
somewhat difficult, difficult, and very difficult task within each skill. Figure 6 illustrates 
the process of each skill (n) as it was presented to the non-IT professional. Each skill 
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began with a scenario (e.g., n.1) and then presented the hands-on task with four response 
options (e.g., n.1.1). For some skills, the individual’s response warranted an alternate 
scenario for maintaining the incremental level of difficulty. When this occurs, scenarios 
were identified as A and B as seen in the somewhat difficult category of Figure 6.  
 Once the set of tasks for a specific skill was completed by the non-IT 
professional, the next set of tasks began with a relevant scenario followed with the easiest 
cybersecurity related task and incrementing to the very difficult cybersecurity related 
task. This process continued until a response was received for each task. A total weighted 
score interval of zero to 40 was possible for each cybersecurity skill. During an iteration 
of a Delphi technique, the SMEs were asked to assign each cybersecurity skill (CSi) a 
weight,𝑊𝑊𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖, ranging from zero to one. A coefficient was identified after the set number 
of cybersecurity skills were established in order to display the overall CSI score range of 
zero to 100. After completing all tasks, the MyCyberSkills™ iPad app displayed the 
achieved overall CSI score interval of zero to 100 and the score interval of zero to 100 for 
each individual cybersecurity skill. 
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Figure 6. Scenario-based, hands-on task skill levels 
 
Reliability and Validity 
 Reliability may exist without validity, but validity cannot exist without reliability 
(Mendoza, 2014; Reinard, 2006). Moreover, validity and reliability influence the amount 
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a researcher may learn about the phenomenon under investigation (Leedy & Ormrod, 
2013). Within this development research, the use of the sequential-exploratory method 
allowed for the capitalization of the benefits from each qualitative and quantitative 
research approach to collect data (Greene, Caracelli, & Graham, 1989; Terrell, 2011). 
Reliability ensures consistent or error-free results are produced (Rogers, 1995), as well as 
makes “a statement about measurement accuracy” (Boudreau, Gefen, & Straub, 2001, p. 
5). Thus, this study evaluated the MyCyberSkills™ iPad app in an iterative development 
process, in addition to analyzing the data captured (Onwuegbuzie, Bustamante, & 
Nelson, 2010; Sheng et al., 2007).   
Reliability  
 The CSI was developed to measure the cybersecurity skills level of non-IT 
professionals incorporated into the MyCyberSkills™ iPad app. An index’s reliability is 
determined by reproducibility and consistency (Helminen, Halonen, Rankinen, Nissinen, 
& Rauramaa, 1995). Without stability and internal consistency, the measurement 
precision of an index is viewed as weak (Helminen et al., 1995; Chakhssi, de Rulter, & 
Bernstein, 2010). Therefore, the MyCyberSkills™ iPad app assessment was validated 
with rigorous testing. As the scenarios-based, hands-on tasks were developed, each 
response received a score. To ensure the correct score was recorded and the participant 
received an accurate CSI score by the MyCyberSkills™ iPad app, 21 non-IT 
professionals were observed while demonstrating their hands-on tasks during the pilot-
test of the initial app. As the participants demonstrated each task, the action taken was 
manually recorded and scored. The overall CSI score and individual skills scores were 
then manually calculated. If the manual calculations compared to those calculated by the 
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MyCyberSkills™ iPad app matched, reliability and validity was established. Thus, the 
individual task scores, the overall score for each skill, and the CSI score was validated 
using this manual process. Moreover, to ensure a higher reliability of this study, a balance 
was found among factors (i.e., data collection environment, length of the test) which were 
identified to effect reliability and validity (Reinard, 2006).  
Validity 
An index is considered valid based on its relevance and provision of an accurate 
assessment of what it is measuring (Alias, 2015). Incorporating the validation of a 
measure can help substantiate research findings, as well as “move the IS field forward 
toward meaningful replicated studies” (Straub, 1989, p. 162). Striving for validation, a 
panel of 8 experts were asked how relevant each task was in accessing the respective skill 
and to describe in their own words revisions (if any) needed to the skill or task (Boudreau 
et al., 2001; Nelson, Bustamante, Wilson, & Onwuegbuzie, 2008). Moreover, asking for 
IS and cybersecurity experts’ comments and suggestions ensured the MyCyberSkills™ 
iPad app maintained consistency, ‘state-of-the-art’ knowledge, and industry practicality 
(Ball et al., 2015; Wang, Nieveen, & van den Akker, 2007). Therefore, this study reduced 
the threat to validity by using scenarios-based, hands-on tasks that were validated through 
an expert panel following the Delphi technique (Ramim & Lichvar, 2014). Furthermore, 
eliciting the feedback from the SMEs ensured both validity and reliability that the criteria 
used to develop the CSI measure was appropriate (Brown, Levy, Ramim, & Parrish, 
2015). 
Pilot-Test Initial App 
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 Once the MyCyberSkills™ iPad app was developed, it was subjected to a pilot-
test (Creswell, Plano Clark, Gutmann, & Hanson, 2003). As part of the pilot-test of the 
initial app, 21 non-IT professionals were observed while demonstrating their skills with 
the presented hands-on, cybersecurity tasks. Appendix E provides the pilot study 
recruitment email. Prior to beginning the pilot test, all participants were asked to 
acknowledge and sign an informed consent form as seen in Appendix F. The main focus 
of this pilot-test was on instrument (i.e., indices, scales) fidelity (Collins, Onwuegbuzie, 
& Sutton, 2006; Vogt & Johnson, 2011). Regardless of research paradigm, instrument 
fidelity is defined as the goal in every study “to obtain data that has one or more of the 
following characteristics: trustworthiness, credibility, dependability, objectivity, 
confirmability, and/or transferability” (Collins et al., 2006, p. 77). Moreover, this pilot-
test ensured the appropriateness of each item (Onwuegbuzie et al., 2010). Furthermore, it 
assessed 1) the extent to which the scenarios and tasks of the MyCyberSkills™ iPad app 
appeared relevant and interesting to the respondent; 2) the specific tasks measured the 
intended content area; and 3) the tasks sampled the respective skill (Onwuegbuzie et al., 
2010). At this phase, outcome validity and generalizability were important in order to 
assess the consequences of using the MyCyberSkills™ iPad app and the extent the 
meaning of scores may be generalized to other populations (Collins et al., 2006; 
Onwuegbuzie et al., 2010).  
 Rigorous testing and an expert-panel as discussed at length in earlier sections 
were fundamental in establishing fidelity of the CSI benchmarking index and the 
MyCyberSkills™ iPad app. Furthermore, open-ended questions were available for 
participants to provide feedback on the MyCyberSkills™ iPad app. Sequentially 
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collecting qualitative and quantitative data allowed for the identification of themes in the 
SMEs’ validated skills, which were integrated into the design and development of the 
MyCyberSkills™ iPad app (Creswell et al., 2003). Moreover, collecting both qualitative 
and quantitative data at this phase not only enhanced the MyCyberSkills™ iPad app, but 
also validated the CSI (Nelson et al., 2008; Onwuegbuzie et al., 2010). Thus, the 
feedback and results from this pilot-test were analyzed and all adjustments to the CSI 
and/or MyCyberSkills™ iPad app were completed. At the conclusion of the pilot test, 
each participant was given the opportunity to attend a cybersecurity workshop offered by 
the researcher as a token of appreciation for their time.  
Design and Empirical Study: Revised App 
 Problematic items identified during the initial pilot-test were revised or discarded 
(Onwuegbuzie et al, 2010; Sheng et al., 2007). After the initial app was revised, an 
empirical study was conducted using the previously developed and validated iPad app. 
This quantitative phase of the developmental research study collected data from 188 non-
IT professionals and documented the results of the measure. Furthermore, 
recommendations for the administration as a result from the data analysis are presented in 
Chapter Five. Additional information regarding the sample, data collection, and analysis 
follows.  
 
Population and Sample 
 This study evaluated the cybersecurity skills level of 188 non-IT professionals 
using the developed CSI. These non-IT professionals were recruited at multiple public 
places located within the Southeastern United States. Appendix G was utilized to recruit 
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participants for the empirical research study. With the assistance of demographic data, the 
sample characteristics in the research were used to test the representation of the data 
collected to the generalized study population (Sekaran & Bougie, 2013). Although 
inferential statistics were not performed on categorical data, (i.e., age, gender) collecting 
the data assists in identifying the characteristics of the participants (Terrell, 2012). 
Therefore, demographic data, such as age, gender, as well as job function, were collected 
as part of this research study. 
Data Collection 
 Prior to beginning the empirical research study, participants were asked to 
complete an informed consent form as seen in Appendix H. With the use of the validated 
MyCyberSkills™ iPad app, 188 non-IT professionals were presented a set of 
cybersecurity skills related tasks. Each task contained four possible responses. As the 
participants responded to each task, the score associated with that response was recorded 
on a spreadsheet stored as a password protected Google document. After all participants 
completed the MyCyberSkills™ app, a cybersecurity workshop was provided to assist the 
participants in furthering their cybersecurity knowledge, experience, and abilities.  
 Pre-analysis data screening involved the process of detecting and dealing with 
irregularities or problems with the collected data (Levy, 2006). It may also indicate that 
the developed tool is not performing as expected. According to Mertler and Vannatta 
(2010), data must be checked for accuracy and consistency. Furthermore, rigorous data 
examination must be completed prior to final analysis of data as missing data may create 
substantial effects (Alias, 2015; Hair, Black, Babin, & Anderson, 2010). Thus, missing 
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data were evaluated during and prior to the final analysis of data to ensure a consistent, 
valid, and reliable tool (Levy, 2006; Onwuegbuzie et al., 2010).  
Data Analysis 
 Findings of the data collected from the literature review, the expert panel, and the 
MyCyberSkills™ iPad app initial pilot-test was used to develop a valid and reliable 
assessment of cybersecurity skills levels. Furthermore, an empirical study using the 
validated MyCyberSkills™ iPad app was conducted with a group of 21 non-IT 
professionals. The iterative processes lead to increased instrument fidelity as well as 
reliability and validity (Alias, 2015; Onwuegbuzie et al., 2010). By using literature and 
an expert panel, the identification of the most common cybersecurity organizational 
threats addressed RQ1. This study addressed RQ2 by using the literature review and 
expert panel for establishing the four tasks for each of the skills needed to thwart the most 
common cybersecurity organizational threats. This research study addressed RQ3 by 
validating the CSI benchmarking index with the expert panel and pilot-test. Testing the 
level of cybersecurity skills of 188 non-IT professionals using the same CSI developed in 
RQ3 addressed RQ4. To assess the fifth research question, descriptive and one-way 
Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) was conducted on age, educational level, gender, job 
function, primary online activity, number of hours accessing the Internet, and experience 
using technology to identify any significant differences to CSI scores. 
 
Resources  
 In order to complete this study the following resources were used:  
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• Access to a pool of non-IT professionals in the U.S.: The sample was 
collected from a population of non-IT professionals recruited from 
multiple public places located in the Southeastern United States. This 
sample was accessible and approved through the IRB process.  
• App developers: App developers were required to assist with 
programming the MyCyberSkills™ tool. These developers were recruited 
from a population of students at two institutions of higher education 
located in the state of Florida. The developers assisted in programming the 
MyCyberSkills™ prototype used in collecting data for this research study. 
• Articulate Storyline 2: This software package was used by the app 
developers to transform the written scenarios-based, hands-on tasks into a 
Web-based prototype. The prototype was published using HTML5, Flash, 
and JavaScript.  
• Expert panel: Many phases of this research relied on an expert panel of 
industry, academic, and government professionals in the cybersecurity 
field. Feedback from the expert panel was used to identify the top nine 
cybersecurity skills as well as the validity of the scenarios, tasks, and 
scores presented in the MyCyberSkills™ iPad app. 
• Google forms: This web-based tool was used to develop the expert survey 
instrument as well as record the data collected upon the participant 
completing the iPad app. An account was activated for use and the survey 
was designed to ensure successful implementation of the tool.  
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• Statistical analysis tool: Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) 
was used to complete descriptive statistics, frequency distributions, and 
ANOVA. Lists and graphs were created using the SPSS tool to compile 
and analyze the results.  
• Technology: Each step of the dissertation process required the use of 
hardware, software, networking, and library resources. Communications 
with advisor and committee, researching the literature, and writing the 
dissertation report was completed using this technology. All necessary 
technology components were acquired. 
 
Summary  
 Chapter Three included a description of the research design, methodology, an 
explanation of the MyCyberSkills™ iPad app, and measures that were used in this 
research study. This study was classified as developmental in nature and used a 
sequential-exploratory approach to validate the reliability of the CSI benchmarking index 
and MyCyberSkills™ iPad app. A discussion of methods was presented that answered 
the five research questions. The cybersecurity skills benchmarking index was developed 
using a literature review, in addition to feedback by an expert panel. The assessment 
criteria was based on literature and initiated the process. Next, SMEs evaluated the 
cybersecurity threats, related skills, and their respective weights used in the CSI. 
Feedback from the SMEs were then used to revise the CSI until a consensus was reached 
using the Delphi technique. According to McFadzean et al. (2011) as well as Skinner et 
al. (2015), this methodology is acceptable to assess the reliability and validity of the CSI. 
86 
 
Issues pertaining to reliability and validity of the CSI and MyCyberSkills™ iPad app 
were discussed along with how they were mitigated. 
 Next, the population and sample for this research study was presented, which 
included the selection criteria of the non-IT professionals. Furthermore, the pre-analysis 
data screening, as well as the data analysis addressed the research questions. Pre-analysis 
data screening was used to “detect irregularities or problems with the collected data” 
(Levy, 2006, p. 150). It assisted in identifying when the developed tool was not 
performing as intended. Chapter Three concludes with the resources that were used to 
conduct this research study.   
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Chapter 4 
Results 
 
Overview 
 Outlined within this chapter are the results of the data analysis for this research 
investigation. The results for this study were completed in three phases. Details of each 
phase are presented in the order conducted. Phase One details the data collection for the 
expert panel using the Delphi technique, which was then used to develop a novel 
scenarios-based, hands-on cybersecurity skills benchmarking index. The results of Phase 
One address RQ1 and RQ2.  
 Phase Two details the development of a the MyCyberSkills™ iPad app prototype 
using gathered expert panel feedback with the Delphi technique as well as a pilot study to 
ensure the prototype accurately recorded scores. The results of Phase Two address RQ3. 
The conclusion of the chapter includes Phase Three, the results summary using the 
MyCyberSkills™ iPad app prototype, and the data analysis processes used. The results of 
Phase Three address RQ4 and RQ5. 
 
Qualitative Research and Expert Panel (Phase One) 
 This study employed the Delphi technique for the purpose of identifying the 
expert opinion of cybersecurity threats and related skills (Ramim & Lichvar, 2014). The 
Delphi technique is an iterative group communication process that allows for experts to 
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address complex problems in an effective manner and without direct confrontation 
(Dalkey & Helmer, 1963; Okoli & Pawlowski, 2004; Ramim & Lichvar, 2014). 
Anonymity was maintained in this phase of this research study with the use of Web-based 
questionnaires (Rowe & Wright, 1999). Between each questionnaire, the SMEs’ 
responses were incorporated into the next questionnaire to control the feedback.  
 The first round of the Delphi technique consisted of 12 platform independent 
cybersecurity threats. After a survey of the existing body of knowledge, these threats 
were identified and presented to SMEs from the Florida chapter of the InfraGard, a 
public-private partnership between the United States Federal Bureau of Investigation 
(FBI)’s cyber division and private sector that focus on cybersecurity, along with SMEs 
from other federal agencies such as the United States Secret Services’ (USSS) Electronic 
Crimes Task Force team and industry. The SMEs were asked to rank in order of 
importance the threats that non-IT professionals poses for organizational cybersecurity 
posture. Based on the SMEs’ feedback, the list of 12 platform independent cybersecurity 
threats were narrowed to 10 platform independent cybersecurity threats. In the second 
Delphi technique round, the 10 cybersecurity threats identified as the most significant 
were then presented to the panel of SMEs in a Web-based survey using a seven-point 
Likert scale. Based on a score of ‘1’ for strongly disagree and ‘7’ for strongly agree, each 
of the cybersecurity threats were evaluated to determine 1) if it was valid to be included 
in the core fundamental cybersecurity threat set, 2) if a proposed platform independent 
skill is valid or not; and 3) if each proposed skill is independent from other proposed 
cybersecurity skills. Moreover, the SME panel were asked to provide a ranking of ‘1’, 
representing the highest threat, to ‘10’, representing a lessor threat. The skill importance 
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weight for each skill was calculated so the lessor threat received a weight closer to 0.0, 
while the highest ranked threat received a weight closer to 1.0. The threats are based on 
their skill importance weight in causing harm to organizations and individuals, while 
forming the foundations for the development of the hierarchical-based indexing to 
measure an overall measure of cybersecurity skills. The survey instruments were 
designed electronically using Google forms.  
 A consensus of SMEs’ opinion emerged with the top nine cybersecurity skills 
needed for non-IT professionals. Malware, PII, and WIS related threats were the distinct 
categories identified among the cybersecurity threats and identified matching skills. At 
the end of the second Delphi round, the difference between the lowest ranked 
cybersecurity threat/skill and the highest was nearly 2.28. Cybersecurity threat and 
corresponding skill number 10, preventing unauthorized information system access via 
workstation lock or log out, was identified as an outlier and the SMEs highly 
recommended discarding it. Table 16 displays the collective results of both Delphi rounds 
identifying the top nine platform independent cybersecurity skills, their respective 
category, SME rankings, number of SME responses, ranked weighted total, ranked 
average, and skill importance weight. These results were used to address the first and 
second research questions of this study. Moreover, the top nine platform independent 
cybersecurity skills, their respective category, SME rankings, and skill importance weight 
was the foundation for the start of Phase Two. 
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Table 16 
 
Rankings of the Top Nine Cybersecurity Skills 
 
 
Qualitative and Quantitative Research (Phase Two) 
 The development and validation of a comprehensive set of scenarios-based, 
hands-on benchmarking index was a good step in the right direction. At the beginning of 
Phase Two and using the results of Phase One as a foundation, the designed set of 
observable scenarios-based, hands-on tasks that measure cybersecurity skills of non-IT 
professionals without the bias of or need for self-assessment were operationalized into a 
MyCyberSkills™ iPad app prototype. Each skill was designed in this study to include a 
group of four cybersecurity related hands-on tasks for the non-IT professional to identify 
and demonstrate their skill level as if in a real-life situation (Hovav & D’Arcy, 2012; 
Vance et al., 2012). The sum of all nine skills multiplied times their respective weight 
(wi) was then multiplied times the coefficient of 2.5. This resulted in the non-IT 
professionals’ CSI score of zero to 100. With the use of literature, (e.g., Glazer and 
Yadron 2014), a scenario began each task. The written scenarios-based, hands-on tasks 
were transformed into a digital presentation with the use of Articulate Storyline 2. Table 
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17 displays the CSI, the SMEs ranked cybersecurity skills (SKi), their respective hands-
on tasks (𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗), description, range, and weight. These results were incorporated into the 
design and development of the MyCyberSkills™ iPad app prototype.  
Table 17 
 
Cybersecurity Skills Index and SMEs Ranked Cybersecurity Skills 
 
 
 After transforming each of the skills into a digital presentation, a panel of eight 
SMEs was presented a questionnaire in a portable document format (PDF) soliciting 
qualitative and quantitative feedback on the scenarios, tasks, and scoring of the prototype. 
Table 18 lists the collective feedback from all experts and the adjustments made to the 
initial MyCyberSkills™ prototype. Recommendations of the SMEs’ were incorporated 
into the prototype before the second round of the Delphi technique began. The expert 
panel was asked to repeat the review process again on the revised MyCyberSkills™ iPad 
app prototype at which time the interpretation of the original feedback and adjustments 
was validated. At the conclusion of round two of the Delphi technique, a consensus of 
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SMEs’ opinion was reached regarding the digital presentation of the scenarios, tasks, and 
scoring within the MyCyberSkills™ iPad app prototype. Thus, no additional iterations 
with the expert panel were required. The Delphi technique reinforced the validity of the 
MyCyberSkills™ iPad app prototype.  
Table 18 
 
Delphi Expert Panel Suggested Adjustments to Initial Prototype 
Change # Feedback Adjustments 
1. The “I don’t know” button 
for aborting a task was 
confusing and values scored 
too high.  
All “I don’t know” options were changed to 
a different action or “no change” option and 
values assigned according to possible threat 
mitigation. 
   
2. Scenario associated with 
question 2.2a and 2.2b does 
not address preventing 
malware via non-secure 
Websites. 
The scenario was changed to request a 
driver update to simulate a malware 
infection threat. 
   
3. Question 6.2 needs to ask for 
credit card information not 
MoneyPak. 
Image for question 6.2 revised to ask for 
credit card information. 
   
4. Question 7.1 should have an 
option to “do nothing” or 
“leave in parking garage”. 
“I don’t know” option was changed to 
“leave USB on the ground”. 
   
 
 Furthermore, throughout the development process rigorous testing was completed 
to ensure the validity and reliability of the MyCyberSkills™ iPad app prototype. To 
ensure the correct score was recorded by the prototype, the business administrator sent a 
participation email to the non-IT professionals on staff at a public place of worship in the 
Southeastern United States for completing the MyCyberSkills™ iPad app prototype. Out 
of the 40 invitations to participate, 21 non-IT professionals were observed while 
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demonstrating their hands-on tasks during the pilot-test, generating a 52.5% response 
rate. When comparing the manually recorded scores to the automatically recorded scores, 
a scoring anomaly was noted early in the pilot-test. The anomaly was corrected prior to 
the conclusion of Phase Two. Any revisions to the MyCyberSkills™ iPad app prototype 
were made prior to the empirical study (Sheng et al., 2007; Terrell, 2012). Thus, the third 
research question and goal of this study was addressed with the novel CSI 
operationalized with the MyCyberSkills™ prototype. Furthermore, to address the fourth 
and fifth research questions and goals in Phase Three, the validated and reliable 
MyCyberSkills™ iPad app prototype was the tool used for collecting data from non-IT 
professionals and documenting the results of the measure.  
 
Quantitative Research (Phase Three) 
Pre-Analysis Data Screening 
 In Phase Three, participants were recruited by 1) a participation flyer posted 
throughout a public place of worship located in the Southeastern United States as well as 
2) flyers and emails shared with multiple public places of business (i.e., restaurants, 
medical offices, etc.). Participants were invited to attend a cybersecurity workshop or 
receive a $5 Starbucks gift card as a token of appreciation for completing the 
MyCyberSkills™ iPad app prototype. Out of 975 individuals invited, 245 responses were 
collected, generating a 25.1% response rate.  
 Prior to completing the MyCyberSkills™ prototype, participants were asked 
demographic and technology usage questions. These responses were recorded prior to the 
participant beginning the MyCyberSkills™ iPad app prototype. Elimination of cases with 
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response-set, verification of missing data, and addressing extreme cases or outliers was 
performed in the pre-analysis data screening to ensure the accuracy of the data collected 
(Levy, 2006). Pre-analysis data screening revealed 57 participants that began the study, 
but did not complete the MyCyberSkills™ iPad app prototype tool.  
 Data accuracy was not a matter of concern as the prototype was designed to allow 
only a single valid answer for each task. Additionally, completed responses were 
downloaded into a Google form and imported into Statistical Package for the Social 
Sciences (SPSS) for further pre-analysis data screening. The data set was analyzed for 
any response-set issues, where participants selected the same scale value for all the 
technology usage questions. After a visual inspection, no response-set cases appeared. 
Respondents were forced to select from a fixed set of answers and were unable to leave 
any items unanswered. However, to ensure the accuracy of the data, descriptive statistics 
were used to identify the minimum and maximum value for each skill score to determine 
if responses were within the expected value range and were not accidently corrupted 
during the transfer of data between Google forms and SPSS. All responses were within 
the expected ranges and none were removed. Thus, generating 188 or 19.3% non-IT 
professional responses for analysis.  
 The means and standard deviations for the individual skills one to nine, skill 
categories, and overall CSI for the population were calculated. A review of the calculated 
means of the individual skills, skill categories, and overall CSI was used to address the 
fourth research question and goal of this study. Table 19 presents the means and standard 
deviations for the population. With a mean of 81.4%, the participants appeared most 
skilled in the preventing the leaking of confidential information (SK1). Moreover, the 
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participants appeared least skilled in the preventing malware via Email (SK5) with a 
mean of 47.4%. Figure 7 presents a visualization of the means of the individual skills 
(e.g., SK1, SK2, SK3, SK4, SK5, SK6, SK7, SK8, & SK9) and the malware, PII, and WIS 
categories sorted from highest to lowest along with the overall CSI for the population.  
Table 19 
 
Means and Standard Deviations for the Population (N=188) 
  Item Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Individual Skills 
SK1 Leak Confidential Info 0.814 0.142 
SK2 Malware via Non-Secure Web 0.493 0.190 
SK3 PII Theft via Non-Secure Web 0.484 0.298 
SK4 PII Theft via email 0.598 0.198 
SK5 Malware via email 0.474 0.185 
SK6 Credit Card Theft via Non-Secure Web 0.581 0.159 
SK7 USB Exploits 0.652 0.191 
SK8 Password Exploits 0.725 0.175 
SK9 PII Theft via Social Network 0.636 0.215 C
ategories 
WIS (SK1, SK7, & SK8) 0.730 0.119 
Malware (SK2, SK5, & SK6) 0.516 0.116 
PII (SK3, SK4, & SK9) 0.573 0.161 
 Overall CSI 0.605 0.099 
 
 
Figure 7. Means of the Individual Skills, Skill Categories, and Overall CSI  
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Demographic Analysis 
 After completing the pre-analysis data screening, 188 responses remained for 
analysis, with demographics that represents a likeness to that of the general sample 
targeted. Of which, 107 or 56.9% were females and 81 or 43.1% were completed by 
males. An analysis of the participants’ ages revealed that 122 or 64.9% were 20 to 54 
years of age. Overall, 151 or 80.3% had a primary activity of work related tasks, social 
network (Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, etc.), or search engine (Google, Yahoo, Bing, 
etc.) and 124 or 66.0% accessed the Internet 6 to 30 hours per week. While nearly 35% of 
the participants were in administrative staff, managerial, or executive job functions, over 
50% of participants responded with the job function of ‘other’. Given a community 
approach was used to recruit participants, a response of ‘other’ could include occupations 
such as nurses, teachers, dental assistants, cashiers, and wait staff. Moreover, an analysis 
of the participants’ education revealed 120 or 63.8% had completed a college or graduate 
degree, 56 or 29.8% had earned a high school diploma, as well as 12 or 6.4% responded 
with ‘other’ education. After further review, a participants’ response of ‘other’ education 
indicated an industry certification or license obtained outside of the secondary or higher 
education institutions (i.e., nursing or teaching certification, etc.). Moreover, 159 or 
84.6% of the participants indicated having neutral to absolutely expert level of experience 
using technology. Appendix I displays the details of the demographics of the population.  
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Table 20 
 
Descriptive Statistics of the Population (N=188) 
Item Frequency Percentage (%) 
Gender   
Male 81 43.1% 
Female 107 56.9% 
   
Age   
18 or 19 years 11 5.8% 
20 to 24 years 21 11.2% 
25 to 34 years 41 21.8% 
35 to 44 years 27 14.4% 
45 to 54 years 33 17.5% 
55 to 64 years 36 19.2% 
65 or older 19 10.1% 
   
Academic Level   
High school diploma 56 29.8% 
College degree 90 47.9% 
Graduate degree 30 15.9% 
Other 12 6.4% 
   
Job Function   
Administrative staff 38 20.2% 
Managerial 18 9.6% 
Executive 8 4.3% 
Operations 9 4.8% 
Physical security 2 1.0% 
Information Technology 10 5.3% 
Technical Services 5 2.7% 
Other 98 52.1% 
   
Accessing the Internet   
0 to 5 hours 10 5.3% 
6 to 10 hours 42 22.4% 
11 to 15 hours 19 10.1% 
16 to 20 hours 19 10.1% 
21 to 25 hours 23 12.2% 
26 to 30 hours  21 11.2% 
31 or more hours 54 28.7% 
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Table 20 
 
Descriptive Statistics of the Population (N=188) (Cont.) 
Item Frequency Percentage (%) 
Primary Internet Activity   
Work related tasks 76 40.4% 
Social network (Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, etc.) 31 16.5% 
Search engine (Google, Yahoo, Bing, etc.) 44 23.4% 
Personal finances (banking, bill paying, etc.) 5 2.7% 
Entertainment (music, movies, video games, etc.) 10 5.3% 
Shopping or auctions (eBay, Amazon, etc.) 17 9.0% 
Personal communication (email, voice over IP, etc.) 
 
5 2.7% 
Experience with Technology   
Absolutely no experience  2 1.1% 
Somewhat no experience  9 4.8% 
Slightly no experience  18 9.6% 
Neutral experience  46 24.4% 
Slightly expert experience  67 35.6% 
Somewhat expert experience  34 18.1% 
Absolutely expert experience  12 6.4% 
 
 
 Two types of analyses were conducted to assess for any difference between the 
two recruitment locations: frequencies and percentages as well as a one-way analysis of 
variance (ANOVA). The population was divided into two groups. This research study 
compared the two groups: Group A and Group B. Group A included individuals from a 
public place of worship within the Southeastern United States. Group B included 
individuals from multiple public places of business (i.e., restaurants, medical offices, 
etc.). Group A included 108 or 57.4% individuals of a public place of worship. Group B 
included 80 or 42.6% individuals from public places of business. Details of the 
demographics of the population of each group are presented in Table 21. 
 
99 
 
Table 21 
 
Descriptive Statistics for Each Group in the Population 
 Group A 
(N=108) 
Group B 
(N=80) 
Item Frequency Percentage 
(%) 
Frequency Percentage 
(%) 
Gender     
Male 48 44.4% 33 41.2% 
Female 60 55.6% 47 58.8% 
     
Age     
18 or 19 years 3 2.8% 8 10.0% 
20 to 24 years 9 8.3% 12 15.0% 
25 to 34 years 20 18.5% 21 26.3% 
35 to 44 years 12 11.1% 15 18.8% 
45 to 54 years 19 17.6% 14 17.5% 
55 to 64 years 29 26.9% 7 8.7% 
65 or older 16 14.8% 3 3.7% 
     
Academic Level     
High school diploma 34 31.5% 22 27.5% 
College degree 49 45.4% 41 51.2% 
Graduate degree 17 15.7% 13 16.3% 
Other 8 7.4% 4 5.0% 
     
Job Function     
Administrative staff 23 21.3% 15 18.8% 
Managerial 11 10.2% 7 8.7% 
Executive 4 3.7% 4 5.0% 
Operations 2 1.9% 7 8.7% 
Physical security 1 0.9% 1 1.3% 
Information Technology 5 4.6% 5 6.3% 
Technical Services 5 4.6% 0 0.0% 
Other 57 52.8% 41 51.2% 
     
Accessing the Internet     
0 to 5 hours 6 5.6% 4 5.0% 
6 to 10 hours 29 26.9% 13 16.3% 
11 to 15 hours 13 12.0% 6 7.5% 
16 to 20 hours 12 11.1% 7 8.7% 
21 to 25 hours 13 12.0% 10 12.5% 
26 to 30 hours 7 6.5% 14 17.5% 
31 or more hours 28 25.9% 26 32.5% 
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Table 21 
 
Descriptive Statistics for Each Group in the Population (Cont.) 
 Group A 
(N=108) 
Group B 
(N=80) 
Item Frequency Percentage 
(%) 
Frequency Percentage 
(%) 
Primary Internet Activity     
Work related tasks 41 38.0% 35 43.8% 
Social network (Facebook, 
Twitter, etc.) 28 25.9% 16 20.0% 
Search engine (Google, Yahoo, 
Bing, etc.) 18 16.7% 13 16.3% 
Personal finances (banking, bill 
paying, etc.) 7 6.5% 3 3.7% 
Entertainment (music, movies, 
video games, etc.) 7 6.5% 10 12.5% 
Shopping or auctions (eBay, 
Amazon, etc.) 5 4.6% 0 0.0% 
Personal communication (email, 
voice over IP, etc.) 2 1.8% 3 3.7% 
     
Experience with Technology     
Absolutely no experience  2 1.8% 0 0. % 
Somewhat no experience  6 5.6% 3 3.7% 
Slightly no experience  13 12.0% 5 6.3% 
Neutral experience  29 26.9% 17 21.3% 
Slightly expert experience  33 30.6% 34 42.5% 
Somewhat expert experience  16 14.8% 18 22.5% 
Absolutely expert experience  9 8.3% 3 3.7% 
 
 In addition, a one-way ANOVA was conducted to assess the statistical significant 
mean differences for each individual skill, skill categories, and overall CSI between those 
completing the MyCyberSkills™ iPad app prototype at a public place of worship and 
those that completed the prototype at a public place of business. The groups were 
analyzed by using descriptive statistics to calculate the means and standard deviations. 
Table 22 provides the means and standard deviations for each group.  
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 With a mean of 80.6%, Group A (members of a public place of worship) 
participants appeared most skilled in the preventing the leaking of confidential 
information (SK1). Moreover, the participants appeared least skilled in the preventing 
malware via email (SK5) with a mean of 46.3%. When comparing the means of the three 
categories, the mean of the malware category was the lowest at 51.5%. The mean of the 
PII category was 57.3% and the WIS category appeared with the highest mean of 73.2%. 
Thus, presenting a mean difference of 21.7% between the malware and WIS categories. 
Furthermore, the overall CSI mean was 60.4%. Figure 8 presents a visualization of the 
means of the individual skills and the skill categories sorted from highest to lowest along 
with the overall CSI for Group A.  
Table 22 
 
Means and Standard Deviations for Each Group of the Population 
    Group A (N=108) Group B (N=80) 
  Item Mean 
Standard 
Deviation Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Individual Skills 
SK1 Leak Confidential Info 0.806 0.132 0.823 0.154 
SK2 Malware via Non-Secure Web 0.491 0.193 0.495 0.187 
SK3 PII Theft via Non-Secure Web 0.467 0.292 0.506 0.307 
SK4 PII Theft via email 0.600 0.192 0.596 0.209 
SK5 Malware via email 0.463 0.188 0.487 0.181 
SK6 Credit Card Theft via Non-Secure Web 0.592 0.152 0.565 0.169 
SK7 USB Exploits 0.685 0.180 0.606 0.198 
SK8 Password Exploits 0.703 0.174 0.754 0.174 
SK9 PII Theft via Social Network 0.652 0.217 0.615 0.213 C
ategories 
WIS (SK1, SK7, & SK8) 0.732 0.110 0.728 0.131 
Malware (SK2, SK5, & SK6) 0.515 0.114 0.516 0.120 
PII (SK3, SK4, & SK9) 0.573 0.152 0.572 0.173 
 Overall CSI 0.604 0.091 0.605 0.111 
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Figure 8. Means of the Individual Skills, Skill Categories, and Overall CSI for Group A 
(Members of Public Place of Worship) (N=108) 
 
 Group B (members of public places of business) participants also appeared most 
skilled in the preventing the leaking of confidential information (SK1) with a mean of 
82.3%. Moreover, the participants appeared least skilled in the preventing malware via 
email (SK5) with a mean of 48.8%. When comparing the means of the three categories, 
the mean of the malware category was the lowest at 51.6%. The mean of the PII category 
was 57.3% and the WIS category appeared with the highest mean of 72.8%. Thus, 
presenting a mean difference of 21.2% between the malware and WIS categories. 
Furthermore, the overall CSI mean was 60.5%. Figure 9 presents a visualization of the 
means of the individual skills and the skill categories sorted from highest to lowest along 
with the overall CSI for Group B.  
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Figure 9. Means of the Individual Skills, Skill Categories, and Overall CSI for Group B 
(Members of Public Places of Businesses) (N=80) 
 
 Using SPSS to calculate the ANOVAs for each individual skill, skill category, 
and overall CSI by recruitment location, a significance difference, F(1, 186) = 8.038, p = 
0.005, was demonstrated on SK7: Preventing information system compromise via USB or 
storage drive/device exploitations between Group A and Group B participants. Although 
no significant difference, F(1, 186) = 3.867, p = 0.050, was demonstrated on SK8: 
Preventing unauthorized information system access via password exploitations, 
additional research involving this skill is needed. Skills one, two, three, four, five, six, 
and nine had no significant difference between groups with each a p > 0.25. No 
significant differences were demonstrated on the malware, F(1, 186) = 0.000, p = 0.987, 
PII, F(1, 186) = 0.000, p = 0.989, and WIS, F(1, 186) = 0.046, p = 0.830. Furthermore, 
no significant difference, F(1, 186) = 0.005, p = 0.942, was demonstrated on overall CSI 
between each recruitment location. Table 23 provides an overview of the mean square 
scores and ANOVA results. 
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Table 23 
 
ANOVA Results for Each Recruitment Location (N=188) 
  
  ANOVA  
 
Item df 
Mean 
Square 
between 
Groups F Sig.  
Individual Skills 
SK1 Leak Confidential Info 1 0.012 0.635 0.426  
SK2 Malware via Non-Secure Web 1 0.000 0.014 0.906  
SK3 PII Theft via Non-Secure Web 1 0.070 0.786 0.376  
SK4 PII Theft via email 1 0.000 0.014 0.903  
SK5 Malware via email 1 0.026 0.778 0.378  
SK6 Credit Card Theft via Non-Secure Web 1 0.032 1.281 0.259  
SK7 USB Exploits 1 0.285 8.038 0.005 ** 
SK8 Password Exploits 1 0.118 3.867 0.050  
SK9 PII Theft via Social Network 1 0.061 1.312 0.253  C
ategories 
WIS (SK1, SK7, & SK8) 1 0.000 0.046 0.830  
Malware (SK2, SK5, & SK6) 1 0.000 0.000 0.987  
PII (SK3, SK4, & SK9) 1 0.000 0.000 0.989  
 Overall CSI 1 0.000 0.005 0.942  
* - p<.05, ** - p<.01, *** - p<.001 
 
 Reviewing the individual skills, skill categories, and overall CSI, this study 
determines that preventing information system compromise via USB or storage 
drive/device exploitations (SK7) has the most significant difference by recruitment 
location compared to the other skills. However, when SK7 was combined with SK1 and 
SK8 to form the WIS category, there was no significant difference between recruitment 
locations. Furthermore, the overall CSI has no significant difference between groups.  
Data Analysis  
 After the pre-analysis data screening was performed, the descriptive analysis for 
the population (N=188) was conducted. To answer RQ5, the useful responses were 
analyzed using descriptive statistics to calculate the skill categories (e.g., malware, PII, & 
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WIS) as well as overall CSI means and standard deviations by age, gender, educational 
level, job function, primary activity, hours accessing the Internet, and experience using 
technology. It was noted the minimum CSI score was 28.5%, maximum score was 
85.5%, and the overall CSI mean was 60.5%. A review of the means for the malware, PII, 
and WIS categories as well as overall CSI by age group revealed that higher means were 
achieved by those in the 45 to 54 years of age group. Furthermore, those 25 to 34 years of 
age had the second highest means in PII, WIS and overall CSI. Figure 10 presents the 
means and standard deviations of the malware and PII skills categories for each age 
group. Whereas, Figure 11 presents the means and standard deviations of the WIS skill 
category and overall CSI for each age group. Next ANOVAs were conducted to assess if 
there were differences between the skill categories of malware, PII, and WIS, as well as 
overall CSI by age groups. Results of the ANOVA by the WIS category were significant, 
F(6, 181) = 2.218, p = 0.043, suggesting there were differences in age groups by WIS. 
The ANOVA conducted for the malware category was not significant, F(6, 181) = 1.422, 
p = 0.208. Results were similar for the PII category, F(6, 181) = 0.972, p = 0.445. The 
ANOVA conducted for overall CSI was also not significant, F(6, 181) = 1.478, p = 
0.187, suggesting there were no differences in overall CSI by age group. Table 24 
presents the ANOVA results of the three categories as well as overall CSI by age group. 
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Figure 10. Means and Standard Deviations of Malware and PII Skills Categories by Age 
Group (N=188) 
 
 
Figure 11. Means and Standard Deviations of WIS Skills Category and Overall CSI by 
Age Group (N=188) 
 
 
Table 24 
 
ANOVA Results for Age Group (N=188)  
 
  ANOVA  
Item df 
Mean Square 
between Groups F Sig.  
Malware (SK2, SK5, & SK6) 6 0.019 1.422 0.208  
PII (SK3, SK4, & SK9) 6 0.025 0.972 0.445  
WIS (SK1, SK7, & SK8) 6 0.030 2.218 0.043 * 
Overall CSI 6 0.014 1.478 0.187  
* - p<.05, ** - p<.01, *** - p<.001 
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 The means of malware, PII, and WIS categories as well as overall CSI were lower 
for females than males. Figure 12 presents the means and standard deviations of the 
malware, PII, and WIS skills categories as well as overall CSI by gender. One-way 
ANOVAs were conducted to assess if there were differences between the skill categories 
and overall CSI by gender. Results of the ANOVA for the WIS category was significant, 
F(1, 186) = 5.872, p = 0.016, suggesting there were differences in WIS by gender. The 
ANOVA conducted for the malware category was not significant, F(1, 186) = 0.224, p = 
0.636. Results were similar for the PII category, F(1, 186) = 1.442, p = 0.231. The 
ANOVA conducted for overall CSI was also not significant, F(1, 186) = 3.158, p = 
0.077, suggesting there were no differences in overall CSI by gender. Table 25 presents 
the ANOVA results for the malware, PII, and WIS categories as well as overall CSI by 
gender. 
 
 
Figure 12. Means and Standard Deviations of Skill Categories and Overall CSI by 
Gender (N=188)  
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Table 25 
 
ANOVA Results for Gender (N=188)  
 
  ANOVA  
Item df 
Mean Square 
between Groups F Sig.  
Malware (SK2, SK5, & SK6) 1 0.003 0.224 0.636  
PII (SK3, SK4, & SK9) 1 0.037 1.442 0.231  
WIS (SK1, SK7, & SK8) 1 0.081 5.872 0.016 * 
Overall CSI 1 0.031 3.158 0.077  
* - p<.05, ** - p<.01, *** - p<.001 
 
 A review of the calculated means for administrative staff revealed malware, PII, 
WIS and overall CSI percentages attained were higher than those in managerial job 
functions. Figure 13 presents the means and standard deviations of the malware and PII 
skills categories by job function. Furthermore, Figure 14 presents the means and standard 
deviations of the WIS skills category and overall CSI by job function. One-way 
ANOVAs were conducted to assess if there were differences between the skill categories 
and overall CSI by job function. Results of the ANOVA for the overall CSI was not 
significant, F(7, 180) = 1.690, p = 0.113, suggesting there were no significant difference 
in overall CSI by job function. The ANOVA conducted for the malware category was 
also not significant, F(7, 180) = 1.262, p = 0.271. Results were similar for the PII 
category, F(7, 180) = 1.683, p = 0.115. The ANOVA conducted for WIS was also not 
significant, F(7, 180) = 1.128, p = 0.347, suggesting there were no differences in WIS by 
job function. Table 26 presents the ANOVA results of the malware, PII, WIS, and overall 
CSI by job function. 
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Figure 13. Means and Standard Deviations of Malware and PII Skills Categories by Job 
Function (N=188) 
 
 
 
Figure 14. Means and Standard Deviations of WIS Skills Category and Overall CSI by 
Job Function (N=188) 
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Table 26 
 
ANOVA Results for Job Function (N=188) 
 
  ANOVA  
Item df 
Mean Square 
between Groups F Sig.  
Malware (SK2, SK5, & SK6) 7 0.017 1.262 0.271  
PII (SK3, SK4, & SK9) 7 0.042 1.683 0.115  
WIS (SK1, SK7, & SK8) 7 0.016 1.128 0.347  
Overall CSI 7 0.016 1.690 0.113  
* - p<.05, ** - p<.01, *** - p<.001 
 
 The PII and WIS skills categories as well as the overall CSI means of those 
accessing the Internet six to 10 hours weekly were nearly 4.5% to 12.2% higher than 
those accessing the Internet any other times. Moreover, those participants accessing the 
Internet 11 to 15 hours weekly scored nearly 7.0% higher than the other groups. Figure 
15 presents the means and standard deviations of the malware and PII skills categories by 
the number of hours participants accessed the Internet. Furthermore, Figure 16 presents 
the means and standard deviations of the WIS skills category and overall CSI by the 
number of hours the participants accessed the Internet. One-way ANOVAs were 
conducted to assess if there were differences between the malware, PII, WIS categories 
and overall CSI by the number of hours participants accessed the Internet. Results of the 
ANOVA for the overall CSI was not significant, F(6, 181) = 1.663, p = 0.132, suggesting 
there were no significant difference in overall CSI by the number of hours accessing the 
Internet. The ANOVA conducted for the malware category was also not significant, F(6, 
181) = 1.099, p = 0.364. Results were similar for the PII category, F(6, 181) = 1.939, p = 
0.076. The ANOVA conducted for WIS was also not significant, F(6, 181) = 0.648, p = 
0.691, suggesting there were no differences in WIS by the number of hours a participant 
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accessed the Internet. Table 27 presents the ANOVA results of the skill categories as well 
as overall CSI by the number of hours participants accessed the Internet. 
Figure 15. Means and Standard Deviations of Malware and PII Skills Categories by 
Hours Online (N=188) 
 
 
Figure 16. Means and Standard Deviations of WIS Skills Category and Overall CSI by 
Hours Online (N=188)  
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Table 27 
 
ANOVA Results for Hours Accessing the Internet (N=188) 
 
  ANOVA  
Item df 
Mean Square 
between Groups F Sig.  
Malware (SK2, SK5, & SK6) 6 0.014 1.099 0.364  
PII (SK3, SK4, & SK9) 6 0.049 1.939 0.076  
WIS (SK1, SK7, & SK8) 6 0.009 0.648 0.691  
Overall CSI 6 0.016 1.663 0.132  
* - p<.05, ** - p<.01, *** - p<.001 
 
 Review of the means for the malware, PII, and WIS categories as well as overall 
CSI by primary activity revealed approximately 8.0% between the highest and lowest for 
each category. The means for overall CSI by primary activity varied from highest to 
lowest nearly 2.5 percentage points. Figure 17 presents the means and standard deviations 
of the malware and PII skills categories by primary activity. Whereas, Figure 18 presents 
the means and standard deviations of the WIS skills category and overall CSI by primary 
activity. One-way ANOVAs were conducted to assess if there were differences between 
the malware, PII, WIS skills categories, and overall CSI by primary activity. Results of 
the ANOVA for the overall CSI was not significant, F(6, 181) = 0.304, p = 0.934, 
suggesting there were no significant difference in overall CSI by primary activity. The 
ANOVA conducted for the malware category was also not significant, F(6, 181) = 0.969, 
p = 0.447. Results were similar for the PII category, F(6, 181) = 0.537, p = 0.779. The 
ANOVA conducted for WIS was also not significant, F(6, 181) = 0.678, p = 0.667, 
suggesting there were no significant differences in WIS by primary activity. Table 28 
presents the ANOVA results of the malware, PII, WIS, and overall CSI by primary 
activity. 
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Figure 17. Means and Standard Deviations of Malware and PII Skills Categories by 
Primary Activity (N=188) 
 
 
 
Figure 18. Means and Standard Deviations of WIS Skills Category and Overall CSI by 
Primary Activity (N=188)  
 
 
114 
 
Table 28 
 
ANOVA Results for Primary Activity (N=188)  
 
  ANOVA  
Item df 
Mean Square 
between Groups F Sig.  
Malware (SK2, SK5, & SK6) 6 0.013 0.969 0.447  
PII (SK3, SK4, & SK9) 6 0.014 0.537 0.779  
WIS (SK1, SK7, & SK8) 6 0.009 0.678 0.667  
Overall CSI 6 0.003 0.304 0.934  
* - p<.05, ** - p<.01, *** - p<.001 
 
 A review of the means for the malware and WIS categories as well as overall CSI 
incremented with education. Furthermore, those with ‘other’ education had the highest 
means for malware, WIS, and overall CSI. The PII category means revealed those with 
college educations had higher percentages than the remaining educational groups. Figure 
19 presents the means and standard deviations of the malware, PII, and WIS skills 
categories as well as and overall CSI by education. To assess if there were differences 
between the malware, PII, and WIS skills categories as well as the overall CSI by 
primary activity, ANOVAs were conducted. Results of the ANOVA revealed the overall 
CSI by education was significant, F(3, 184) = 2.670, p = 0.048, suggesting there were 
significant differences in overall CSI by education. The ANOVA conducted for the 
malware category was not significant, F(3, 184) = 2.461, p = 0.064. Results were similar 
for the PII category, F(3, 184) = 0.937, p = 0.423. The ANOVA conducted for WIS was 
also not significant, F(3, 184) = 2.000, p = 0.115, suggesting there were no significant 
differences in WIS by education. Table 29 presents the ANOVA results of the malware, 
PII, WIS, and overall CSI by education. 
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Figure 19. Means and Standard Deviations of the Skill Categories and Overall CSI by 
Education (N=188)  
 
 
Table 29  
 
ANOVA Results for Education (N=188)  
 
  ANOVA  
Item df 
Mean Square 
between Groups F Sig.  
Malware (SK2, SK5, & SK6) 3 0.032 2.461 0.064  
PII (SK3, SK4, & SK9) 3 0.024 0.937 0.423  
WIS (SK1, SK7, & SK8) 3 0.028 2.000 0.115  
Overall CSI 3 0.025 2.670 0.048 * 
* - p<.05, ** - p<.01, *** - p<.001 
 
 The means for the skill categories and overall CSI incremented as the level of 
experience identified by the participants increased. Moreover, the means of the malware 
and PII skills categories as well as the overall CSI revealed those reporting slightly no 
experience using technology had higher means than those reporting neutral experience 
using technology. Figure 20 presents the means and standard deviations of the malware 
and PII skills categories by the participants’ experience using technology. Whereas, 
Figure 21 presents the means and standard deviations of the WIS skills category and 
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overall CSI. ANOVAs were conducted to assess if there were differences between the 
malware, PII, and WIS categories as well as overall CSI by the participants’ experience 
using technology. Results of the ANOVA for the overall CSI was significant, F(6, 181) = 
2.361, p = 0.032, suggesting there was a significant difference in overall CSI by the 
participants’ experience using technology. Results were similar for the PII category, F(6, 
181) = 2.387, p = 0.030. The ANOVA conducted for the malware category was not 
significant, F(6, 181) = 0.625, p = 0.709. Furthermore, the ANOVA conducted for WIS 
was also not significant, F(6, 181) = 1.746, p = 0.112, suggesting there were no 
significant differences in WIS between groups. Table 30 presents the ANOVA results of 
the malware, PII, WIS, and overall CSI by the participants’ experience using technology. 
Figure 20. Means and Standard Deviations of Malware and PII Skills Categories by 
Experience Using Technology (N=188)  
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Figure 21. Means and Standard Deviations of WIS Skills Category and Overall CSI by 
Experience Using Technology (N=188)  
 
 
Table 30 
 
ANOVA Results for Experience Using Technology (N=188) 
 
  ANOVA  
Item df 
Mean Square 
between Groups F Sig.  
Malware (SK2, SK5, & SK6) 6 0.008 0.625 0.709  
PII (SK3, SK4, & SK9) 6 0.059 2.387 0.030 * 
WIS (SK1, SK7, & SK8) 6 0.024 1.746 0.112  
Overall CSI 6 0.022 2.361 0.032 * 
* - p<.05, ** - p<.01, *** - p<.001 
 
 As indicated from the results above, the fifth research question and goal of this 
study was to empirically assess if there are significant differences on CSI based on age, 
education level, gender, job function, and experience using technology. As seen in the 
results, job function, the number of hours accessing the Internet, and primary activity 
completed while accessing the Internet were found to have no significant differences. 
Only a few items showed a significant difference on CSI. These included experience 
using technology for PII, gender and age group for WIS, as well as educational level and 
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experience using technology for overall CSI. Overall, a large majority showed no 
significant differences on the skill categories and overall CSI.  
 
Summary 
 In this chapter, the results of the study were presented. First, the chapter began 
with Phase One of the research study, which involved qualitative research conducted 
through a literature review in order to develop a new survey instrument for eliciting input 
from the expert panel. The results of both surveys using the Delphi technique were 
discussed. Furthermore, the discussion included the elicitation of the expert panel to 
confirm the platform independent cybersecurity threats and related skills, along with the 
weight allocations that were used to calculate the CSI. Next, Phase Two of the study was 
discussed, which involved the qualitative and quantitative research conducted to 
operationalize the novel CSI into the MyCyberSkills™ iPad app prototype. The 
discussion encompassed the engagement of the expert panel to validate the prototype 
using the Delphi technique and the pilot-test completed to ensure the validity and 
reliability of the developed prototype. The chapter concluded with Phase Three that 
presented the data analysis and results of the MyCyberSkills™ prototype. 
 The five goals of this study were attained using a three-phased approach: the first 
specific goal of this research study was to identify a set of cybersecurity skills pinpointed 
by SMEs as those that can help mitigate critical vulnerabilities. The second specific goal 
of this research study was to develop a set of tasks that could be categorized and linked to 
the SMEs identified set of cybersecurity skills. The third specific goal of this research 
study was to develop a benchmarking index to hierarchically aggregate the set of SMEs 
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identified cybersecurity skills using observable hands-on tasks. The first three goals were 
met with the development of the MyCyberSkills™ prototype, which operationalized the 
single benchmarking Cybersecurity Skills Index ranging from zero to 100. The fourth 
specific goal of this research study was to assess the scores of the CSI benchmarking 
index for the aggregated set of SMEs identified cybersecurity skills of a group of 188 
non-IT professionals. This goal was met as presented in Table 19 and Table 22.  
 The last and fifth goal was to measure if there were any significant differences to 
CSI based on age, gender, educational level, job function, or experience using 
technology. To begin the analysis, a pre-analysis of the data for screening data purpose 
was performed. The screening data resulted in the elimination of 57 responses resulting in 
188 usable cases. A demographic analysis was made to examine more information about 
the population of this study. Details of the demographics of the populations are presented 
in Table 20.  
 This study performed one-way ANOVAs to analyze if there were any significant 
differences to CSI based on age, gender, educational level, job function, or experience 
with technology. Experience using technology for PII, gender and age group for WIS, as 
well as educational level and experience using technology for overall CSI had significant 
differences with a p<0.05. The results of the ANOVA as presented in Table 24, Table 25, 
Table 26, Table 29, and Table 30 met the last and fifth goal of this research study.  
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Chapter 5 
Conclusions, Implications, Recommendations, and Summary 
 
Conclusions 
 Because cyber-attacks have intensified over time, organizations are increasing the 
priority of cybersecurity skills due to substantial financial and information losses caused 
by insiders (APWG, 2016; PwC, 2016). Thus, the main goal of this research study was to 
design, develop, and empirically test a set of hands-on tasks set to measure the 
cybersecurity skills level of non-IT professionals. This study built on prior research that 
defined cybersecurity skills as (i.e., preventing malware, PII theft, & WIS breaches) the 
combination of an individual’s technical knowledge, ability, and experience surrounding 
the hardware and software required to execute IS security to mitigate cyber-attacks 
(Axelrod, 2006; Boyatzis & Kolb, 1991; Choi et al., 2015). This research study achieved 
the five goals with a three-phased approach. First, an expert panel using the Delphi expert 
methodology was used to design and validate the scenarios-based, hands-on 
benchmarking index for measuring cybersecurity skills (Ramim & Lichvar, 2014). 
Second, the previously developed and validated scenarios-based, hands-on benchmarking 
index was operationalized into an iPad app prototype that was used to assess the 
cybersecurity skill of non-IT professionals. Last, the previously developed and validated 
iPad app prototype was used to empirically assess the hands-on cybersecurity skills of 
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non-IT professionals based on demonstrated skills on cybersecurity tasks and document 
the results of the measure. 
 
Discussion 
 The first result of this study was the development of a validated and reliable app 
set to measure the observable cybersecurity skills of non-IT professionals. Furthermore, 
the second result of this study indicated there was a significant difference in the 
cybersecurity skills level of non-IT professionals based on educational level and 
experience using technology. Moreover, there was a significant difference in WIS 
breaches based on gender and age group. In addition, there was a significant difference in 
PII theft based on experience using technology. No significant difference was found in 
CSI, malware, PII theft, or WIS breaches based on a non-IT professional’s job function, 
number of hours accessing the Internet, or primary activity completed while accessing the 
Internet.  
 Overall, not one participant demonstrated 100% skilled in all of the cybersecurity 
tasks. This suggests a need for cybersecurity skilled non-IT professionals and the 
MyCyberSkills™ tool to help mitigate the opportunities for organizational information 
vulnerabilities and breaches. Third, the results indicated that higher levels of education 
increased a non-IT professional’s demonstrated cybersecurity skills. Fourth, as 
experience using technology increased, the non-IT professionals demonstrated improved 
skills on cybersecurity tasks. Fifth, the results of those in administrative staff positions 
demonstrated higher cybersecurity skills than those in managerial job functions. Last, 
those 18 to 24 as well as 65 and older demonstrated less cybersecurity skills than those 
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ages 20 to 64. This insinuates non-IT professionals entering or exiting the workforce may 
be at a higher risk of falling for a cyber-attack.  
 Limitations were noted with this study. The first limitation of this study is the 
generalizability of the specific index values (not the weights) due to the sample used. It is 
expected that the SMEs composed hierarchical weights will be generalized in the future, 
but over time, the use of the CSI on different organizations may gather different values. 
Next, the collected data were limited to several organizations within the Southeastern 
United States. While the sample size of 188 non-IT professionals is valid, further studies 
conducted can recruit participants from a wider community approach to increase 
validation of the results and generalizability. Furthermore, the scenarios-based, hands-on 
skills measured are another limitation. As new cyber threats arise, other scenarios-based, 
hands-on tasks can be developed and incorporated into the CSI for revising the 
MyCyberSkills™ prototype used in this study. Finally, the quantity of time needed to 
complete the MyCyberSkills™ prototype was another limitation. 
 
Implications 
 The outcomes of this study contributed notably to the body of knowledge, and has 
several implications for providing researchers and practitioners insight into the 
cybersecurity skills level of non-IT professionals. Understanding an employee’s 
cybersecurity skills levels is critical to securing information and the systems that stores it 
as organizations continue to rely on the Internet for conducting their daily operations. 
This research study validated that the CSI benchmarking index could be used to assess 
the hands-on cybersecurity skills of non-IT professionals based on their demonstrated 
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skills on cybersecurity tasks. Furthermore, this research study provides the 
MyCyberSkills™ tool that can be used to assess the cybersecurity skills level of non-IT 
professionals within an organization. This tool could assist organizations with assessing 
cybersecurity skills levels to provide insight into what the organization can do to further 
mitigate threats due to vulnerabilities and breaches caused by non-IT professionals.  
 
Recommendations and Future Research 
 This study was a developmental research and outlined the research approach to 
design and validate the scenarios-based, hands-on benchmarking cybersecurity skills 
index that was used to measure the cybersecurity skills of non-IT professionals. 
Moreover, the inclusion of the sequential-exploratory research method within the 
development contributed to the goodness of data collected and validity of the results 
(Terrell, 2011; Wisdom & Creswell, 2013). The threats, relative skills, and weights of the 
hierarchical measure for observable cybersecurity skills of non-IT professionals were 
developed using the Delphi technique. Followed by the development of the 
MyCyberSkills™ iPad app prototype, which was used for collecting and analyzing data 
using the research plan discussed here. The findings and results of the statistical analyses 
were reported.  
 There are many areas for future research that were identified based on the results 
of this developmental research. First, future studies are warranted to increase the validity 
of the MyCyberSkills™ tool. In addition, more research is needed to take place in and 
outside the Southeastern United States while expanding the sample size to increase the 
generalizability. The second recommendation includes selection of a population with 
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criteria specifically for supervisors and subordinates to determine if the CSI level of a 
supervisor affects the CSI of a subordinate. A third recommendation for future research 
study could be set to determine the effects of organizational culture on the CSI level of 
the employees. Whereas, a fourth recommendation for future research study includes 
investigating the effects of behaviors (i.e., curiosity, boredom, etc.) or emotions (i.e., 
depression, sadness, etc.) on the CSI level of an individual. The fifth recommendation is 
to investigate the relationship, if any, between self-reported cybersecurity skills levels 
and actual demonstrated cybersecurity skills measured using the MyCyberSkills™ tool. 
Finally, the study could be replicated with the scenarios-based, hands-on tasks adapted 
into a video presentation using an audience response system.  
 
Summary 
 This dissertation study addressed the research problem of threats to organizational 
IS due to vulnerabilities and breaches caused by employees (Hovav & Gray, 2014; Jensen 
et al., 2014; Peha, 2013). Conducting transactions, interacting, and sharing information 
on the Internet are a part of everyday life. But, completing activities online does not come 
without its risks as well as potential for harm. Organizations, individuals, and 
governments continue to regularly report substantial information and financial losses due 
to vulnerabilities as well as breaches caused by insiders. But, when it comes to protection 
of corporate IS, human errors and social engineering appear to prevail in circumventing 
such IT protections. This research study facilitated an increase in the body of knowledge 
regarding non-IT professionals as it relates to their cybersecurity skills in the context of 
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malware, PII, and WIS related threats. Moreover, it addressed a valid problem with 
practical significance (Terrell, 2015).  
 The main goal of this research was to design, develop, and empirically test a set 
of hands-on tasks set to measure the cybersecurity skills level of non-IT professionals. 
Building on the work of Berendonk et al. (2013), Choi (2013), Morcke et al., (2013), 
Weigel and Hazen (2014), as well as Vance et al. (2014), this work was classified as a 
developmental research. Thus, it answered the call to develop a hierarchical measure of 
cybersecurity skills levels of non-IT professionals that addressed the problem of 
vulnerabilities and breaches caused by employees (Ellis & Levy, 2009; Ramim & 
Lichvar, 2014). Furthermore, this study sought to determine if there are any significant 
differences to cybersecurity skills levels based on gender, age, level of education, job 
function, primary online activity, hours accessing the Internet, and experience using 
technology. Therefore, a three-phased approach was used to meet the goals of this study 
and answer five research questions.  
 In Phase One, a panel of subject matter experts from the Florida chapter of the 
InfraGard, a public-private partnership between the United States Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI)’s cyber division and private sector that focus on cybersecurity along 
with SMEs from other federal agencies such as the United States Secret Services’ (USSS) 
Electronic Crimes Task Force team and industry were engaged to answer the first three 
research questions as follows.  
RQ1: What are the specific subject matter experts (SMEs) identified set of 
cybersecurity skills of non-IT professionals, which address the most 
common organizational cybersecurity threats? 
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RQ2: What are the specific SMEs identified tasks that can be categorized, linked, 
and validated to the set of the identified cybersecurity skills? 
RQ3: What are the specific SMEs identified weights of the tasks and skills that 
enable a validated hierarchical aggregation to the Cybersecurity Skills 
Index (CSI) benchmarking index? 
The Delphi technique was employed for the purpose of identifying indispensable expert 
opinion. After an extensive literature review, Web-based questionnaires were developed 
for the SMEs to indicate their agreement with the non-platform independent threats, their 
matching skills, and their recommendation for their ranking (weight) allocation. The 
outcome of the two survey rounds was the development of and the relative weight 
allocations for the top nine non-platform independent cybersecurity, along with their 
respective category. 
 Phase Two expanded on the developed and validated comprehensive set of 
scenarios-based, hands-on benchmarking index from Phase One. Each skill was designed 
to include a group of four tasks for the purpose of identifying demonstrated skills levels 
as if in a real-life situation (Hovav & D’Arcy, 2012; Vance et al., 2012). Articulate 
Storyline 2 was then used to transform the written scenarios-based, hands-on tasks into a 
digital presentation. The CSI, SMEs ranked cybersecurity skills, their respective hands-
on tasks, description, range, and weight as presented in Table 17 were incorporated into 
the design and development of the MyCyberSkills™ iPad app prototype. A panel of 
SMEs were then engaged to solicit qualitative and quantitative feedback on the scenarios, 
tasks, and scoring of the prototype. After two rounds of the Delphi technique, pilot 
testing was conducted to ensure the scores were recorded accurately by the prototype. 
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After minor revisions, the validated and reliable MyCyberSkills™ iPad app prototype 
was the tool used for collecting data from 188 non-IT professionals in the third phase of 
this study.  
 The third phase of this research study achieved answers to the remaining research 
questions. First, the highest score of the CSI benchmarking index for the aggregated set 
of SMEs identified cybersecurity skills of the group was 85.5%. The minimum CSI score 
attained was 28.5% with a mean CSI score of 60.5%. Second, there were significant 
differences to CSI for level of education and experience using technology. Furthermore, 
significant differences with a p<0.05 were identified for WIS based on gender and age 
group, as well as PII based on experience using technology. Third, there were no 
significant differences for the malware category. Finally, no significant differences to the 
CSI were identified for job function, the number of hours accessing the Internet, and 
primary online activity. The results suggest that level of education and experience using 
technology may make a difference on the level of vulnerabilities and breaches caused by 
an employee. Whereas, the type of work duties performed, the number of hours nor the 
activity completed online do not appear to make any difference on a non-IT 
professional’s cybersecurity skills level.  
RQ4: What are the scores of the CSI benchmarking index for the aggregated set 
of SMEs identified cybersecurity skills of a group of 188 non-IT 
professionals?  
RQ5: Are there any significant differences to CSI based on age, gender, 
educational level, job function, primary online activity, number of hours 
accessing the Internet, or experience using technology? 
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 As with any research study, this study had three main limitations. First, the set of 
skills combined to form the CSI is a limitation. Second, generalization of the results from 
this research study were cautioned as the reliability and validation of the CSI and 
MyCyberSkills™ tool relied on an expert panel. The expert panel, the relative weights, 
criteria, and measures may not be representative of the broader population. Further 
studies are required with other populations to increase generalizability of the results and 
improve the validity of the instrument. Last, the results represent data at a point in time is 
a limitation.  
 This research study made several contributions to the information security domain 
and body of knowledge. The study provided empirical evidence regarding the magnitude 
of cybersecurity skills to mitigate the risk of vulnerabilities and breaches caused by 
insiders. This evidence is important to academia and practitioners to assist with 
understanding the cybersecurity skills of non-IT professionals. Given the heightened 
concerns of organizations regarding cybersecurity, the results of this research study 
provided organizations with empirical evidence of how to measure the cybersecurity 
skills of their employees. Unidentified inadequate cybersecurity skills of non-IT 
professionals could result in substantial financial and information losses for an individual, 
organization, or government.  
 In conclusion, other researchers can use the CSI benchmarking index to assess 
cybersecurity skills for new populations. The MyCyberSkills™ iPad app prototype can 
be used as a tool by researchers and organizations to assess and provide awareness 
regarding cybersecurity skills. In addition, SETA programs may include the 
MyCyberSkills™ tool to assess and aide in the mitigation of cyber threats.   
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Appendix C 
Expert Recruitment Email 
Dear Information Systems and Cybersecurity Experts,  
 
I need your help in providing expert feedback on a measurement for my upcoming 
doctoral research study. I am a Ph.D. Candidate in Information Systems and 
Cybersecurity at the College of Engineering and Computing, Nova Southeastern 
University (NSU), working under the supervision of Professor Yair Levy, and a member 
of his Levy CyLab. My research is seeking to develop an index to measure cybersecurity 
skills levels of non-Information Technology (IT) professionals.  
 
Using a prior set of experts, nine platform independent cybersecurity skills needed by 
non-IT professionals were identified. The set of nine cybersecurity skills are established 
as the foundation for this phase of the research. In this part of the research, I need your 
assistance in validating the proposed scenarios, tasks, and scores assigned for each task. 
Here are the nine skills previously identified and validated in the first stage of my 
dissertation research: 
 
1. Preventing the leaking of confidential digital information to unauthorized 
individuals 
2. Preventing malware via non-secure Websites 
3. Preventing personally identifiable information (PII) theft via access to non-secure 
networks 
4. Preventing PII theft via e-mail phishing  
5. Preventing malware via e-mail 
6. Preventing credit card information theft by purchasing from non-secured 
Websites  
7. Preventing information system compromise via USB or storage drive/device 
exploitations  
8. Preventing unauthorized information system access via password exploitations 
9. Preventing PII theft via social networks 
 
The information provided will be used for this research study and in aggregated form. No 
personal identifiable information (PII) will be collected. As a participant, you agree to 
keep all information regarding this research confidential and to refrain from disclosing 
any details related to this survey or the material contained within it. Please be advised 
that this research is under process with the NSU’s Cybersecurity Incubator, and as such, 
full confidentiality is required.  
 
If you are willing to participate in this phase of the research, maintain a high level of 
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confidentiality, and non-disclosure as it pertains to the scenarios, tasks, and 
scorings, please reply to this email by April 7, 2016. As a token of appreciation for 
providing your scholarly and professional contribution to the field of cybersecurity, 
you will receive a $10 Starbucks gift card upon completing the questionnaire. After 
receiving your reply, a follow up email with the survey in the form of a fillable PDF 
file attached will be sent to you within 24 hours. If you prefer the PDF file be sent to 
an alternate email address, please provide it with your reply. If you wish to decline, 
please reply indicating that. 
 
Thank you in advance for your consideration. I appreciate your assistance and 
contribution to this research study. Should you wish to receive the findings of the study, 
please indicate it with your reply to this email and I will be happy to provide you with 
information about the academic research publication(s) resulting from this study.  
 
Warmest Regards,  
Melissa Carlton, Ph.D. Candidate 
E-mail: mc2418@nova.edu 
Information Systems and Cybersecurity 
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Appendix D 
Expert Qualitative and Quantitative Questionnaire 
IRB protocol #: 2016-16 
 
Principal investigator(s)             Co-investigator(s) 
Melissa Carlton, Ph.D. Candidate of            Yair Levy, Ph.D.  
Information Systems and Cybersecurity           Information Systems and Cybersecurity 
P.O. Box 7596              College of Engineering & Computing 
Panama City Beach, FL 32413            The DeSantis Building - Room 4058 
Phone: (850) 890-7310             3301 College Avenue 
Email: mc2418@nova.edu             Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33314 
                 Phone: (954) 262-2006 
                Email: levyy@nova.edu 
 
For questions/concerns about your research rights, contact: 
Human Research Oversight Board (Institutional Review Board or IRB)  
Nova Southeastern University 
(954) 262-5369/Toll Free: 866-499-0790 
 
Dear [Expert],  
 
Thank you for agreeing to participate in this phase of my doctoral dissertation research 
study, titled, “Development of the Cybersecurity Skills Index (CSI): A Scenarios-Based, 
Hands-On Tasks Measure of Non-IT Professionals’ Cybersecurity Skills”, maintain a 
high level of confidentiality, and non-disclosure. 
 
The information provided will be used for this research study and in aggregated form. No 
personal identifiable information (PII) will be collected. As a token of appreciation for 
providing your scholarly and professional contribution to the field of cybersecurity, you 
will receive a $10 Starbucks gift card. There are no costs to you for participating in this 
study. Risks to you are minimal, meaning they are not thought to be greater than other 
risks you experience every day. The activities in this study may have unknown or 
unforeseeable risks. Please feel free to contact Mrs. Carlton or Dr. Yair Levy should you 
have any questions or research-related injury. You may also contact the IRB at the 
numbers indicated above with questions as to your research rights.  
 
As a participant, you agree to keep all information regarding this research confidential 
and to refrain from disclosing any details related to this questionnaire or the material 
contained within it with non-NSU individuals and/or parties. You are asked to delete any 
material related to this study from your computer after returning the completed the 
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questionnaire.  
 
You have the right to leave this study at any time or refuse to participate. If you do decide 
to leave or you decide not to participate, you will not experience any penalty or loss of 
services you have a right to receive. If you choose to withdraw, you are asked to delete 
any material related to this study from your computer and to contact Mrs. Carlton or Dr. 
Yair Levy of your decision.  
 
The nine skills previously identified and validated are presented within the attached 
fillable PDF file. Each skill includes a group of four cybersecurity related scenarios-
based, hands-on tasks for the non-IT professional to identify and demonstrate their skill 
level as if in a real-life situation. Questions are presented until you have evaluated all 
nine skills. If you agree with the scenario, task, or scoring presented, you only need to 
select ‘yes’ for the respective question. If you do not agree with any scenario, task, or 
scoring presented, select ‘no’ for that question and complete the respective comment field 
with your recommendation.  
 
As a cybersecurity expert, you are asked to  
• review the scenario and respond if you believe the scenario is valid in the 
context of the related skill; 
• review the task associated with its respective scenario to determine if it 
measures the related skill; 
• evaluate the scoring associated with each of the four options (answers) 
presented for the related task; and  
• evaluate the increment of difficulty for that set of scenarios and tasks. 
 
At the conclusion of the questionnaire, select the ‘email form’ button in order to email the 
form to Professor Yair Levy as a PDF attachment.  
 
Thank you again for your time and assistance.  
 
Warmest Regards,  
Melissa Carlton, Ph.D. Candidate 
E-mail: mc2418@nova.edu 
Information Systems and Cybersecurity 
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Appendix E 
Pilot Study Recruitment Email 
Dear Fellow First Baptist Church Members,  
 
I am a Ph.D. Candidate in Information Systems and Cybersecurity at the College of 
Engineering and Computing, Nova Southeastern University, working under the 
supervision of Professor Yair Levy, and a member of his Levy CyLab. My research is 
seeking to develop an application (app) to measure cybersecurity skills levels of non-
Information Technology (IT) professionals. Non-IT professionals are any person that 
performs work-related duties using a computer connected to the Internet that is not 
located in a formal IT or Technical Services department. Non-IT professionals include, 
but are not limited to, teachers, office assistants, managers, or executives. It excludes IT 
or Technical Services professionals.  
 
I need your assistance to ensure the application is working accurately. The application is 
named MyCyberSkills™ and it will help organizations as well as industry entities to 
assess the cybersecurity skills of non-IT professionals. Your assistance is being solicited 
to complete tasks of nine cybersecurity skills previously identified.  
 
A lab manager will manually record your score based on the responses you select within 
the application for comparison of the electronic scoring system, so I can ensure the 
scoring recorded are accurate. The study is expected to take no more than an hour of your 
time. The information provided will be used for this research study and in aggregated 
form. No personal identifiable information (PII) will be collected. Following the 
experiment, and as a token of appreciation for your time, I will provide a workshop on 
cybersecurity issues and how to protect yourself, your family, and your workplace from 
cyber-attacks. You are welcome to attend this important workshop free of charge right 
after the experiment, or contact me for additional information about future workshops, 
which you are welcome to attend free of charge.  
 
If you are willing to participate, please reply to this email and a lab manager will contact 
you to schedule an appointment.  
 
Thank you in advance for your consideration. I appreciate your assistance and 
contribution to this phase of my research study. 
 
Should you wish to receive the findings of the study, please send me an email and I will 
be happy to provide you with information about the academic research publication(s) 
resulting from this study.  
 
Warmest Regards,  
Melissa Carlton, PhD Candidate 
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E-mail: mc2418@nova.edu 
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Appendix F 
Pilot Study Informed Consent Form
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Appendix G 
Research Study Recruitment Flyer 
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